


The American Catholic Sociological Review

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MARCH 1947



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The American Catholic Sociological Review

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Principles of Rationalization in Race Relations*

EVERETT CHEARINGTON HUGHES

ONE of the most distressing and dangerous of the symptoms of our sick world is the distortion of people's minds and sentiments, and of our social practices and institutions along the axis of racial and cultural (ethnic) differences. It is right and proper that students of society should direct their attention to these symptoms and to their underlying causes. This social scientists have been and are doing. Much valuable work has been and is being done. More power to the people who are doing it; to those anthropologists who have not merely accelerated their investigations into the nature of racial differences but have also launched programs of popular education to clear up misapprehensions. All credit also to those sociologists, political scientists and other specialists who have turned their scientific effort in this direction; and to those people, of various professions, who have undertaken, by bold experiment, to bring more justice into the relations between people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds. And if scholars and other persons who are themselves members of the disadvantaged groups of our society show a special penchant for studying problems of this order, no less credit is due them. It is not only their right, but also their special duty, to undertake research and action which will benefit society at large none the less for being directed especially at injustices done to the group to which they themselves belong. The others of us in social science might, however, search our professional consciences to see whether we do not passively conspire to confine Negro social scientists to study of Negro problems, women to study of the problems of women and children, and so on (for this is one of the subtler forms of discrimination — "Go up higher, brother, to the head of your own table").

The main business of this paper is, however, not to praise, but to criticize the way in which we have gone about the business of improving the relations between races and ethnic groups.

Our main fault has been opportunism, and especially an oppor-

* From a paper presented before the Eighth Annual Convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society, December 28, 1946.

tunism of logic, a fault common enough in American social science and social action. I do not mean that there is necessarily any opportunism in the turning of our attention to the problems of our own time and country. On that point we should not yield an inch to those who would have us choose our objects of study purely on the basis of something called "the state of knowledge" without reference to what is currently going on in the world. There has undoubtedly been some opportunism in choice of problems for investigation by American social scientists; we may have respected sacred cows and may have run after the problems for whose investigation funds are easy to get. An opportunism of logic is, however, much more serious.

The main evidence of the kind of opportunism to which I refer is that we allow the direction of our research and educational effort to be dictated by the enemy, the defenders of racial and ethnic injustice. It is common for people to defend their sentiments and actions by rationalizations. In some societies a given set of rationalizations may last so long as to become traditional. In our society, we are quick to change them. We actively seek new ones; this is one of the functions for annual conventions — to find more up-to-date reasons for our old policies, interests and sentiments. Being scientifically minded, we Americans dress our new rationalizations in the sheep's clothing of science. The inequality in the position of the races in this country was once defended by scriptural quotation; now it is defended by what are called "facts" of biology and psychology. And those of us who are interested in getting new light on and more just action in the relations between peoples, take up the chase. If someone says Negroes have such poor jobs because they are biologically incapable of learning complicated skills, we set about to prove that Negroes can learn to do anything anyone else can learn to do. If then the "fact" of incapacity to learn is modified to say that Negroes are good with their hands, but not with their heads, we get busy to prove that that isn't so, either. Then someone comes along with the defense that although they can learn as well, or almost as well, as other people, Negroes lack sexual or other controls necessary to the nicer positions in our society; we chase that one. Or perhaps Negroes don't smell nice; so we start counting sweat glands. We store the sweat of people of various races in bottles and have it smelt by noses of several shapes, sizes and colors, just as advertising agencies say they do with cigarettes in their "scientific" blind-fold tests — and note with glee that women have more sweat-glands than men and that while the smellers couldn't tell what race the samples came from,

a Chinese man picked as worst of all the sweat of an Anglo-Saxon. Someone will no doubt soon analyse the oil from the skin and hair of some group unfortunately dubbed "greasers." Perhaps some day a broad-minded East Indian will be disturbed by the disgust his fellow-countrymen are said to feel at the sight of lobster-red sun-burned English skin. Desirous of eliminating this unwarranted prejudice against Europeans, he will have chemists make tests; if all goes well, they will find no chemical difference between the beautiful bronze skin of Hindu vegetarians and the parboiled hide of a beef-eating Colonel Blimp.

Now I have no basic objection to the making of such tests, and none to the dissemination, to as many people as possible, of whatever findings result from them. Truth is better than error, and should be spread with the more vigor when the error is one that does great damage. What I do object to is giving the terms of the game into the hands of the enemy, who, by inventing a new rationalization every day, leads us a merry and endless chase. We attack the devil's changing disguises instead of the devil himself.

Each of these rationalizations brought up in defense of racial and ethnic injustices is part of a syllogism. The minor premise, stating an alleged fact, is expressed; the major premise, a principle, is left out. Instead of driving our opponents and ourselves back to the major premise, we are content to question and disprove the minor premise, the allegation of fact.

Suppose we take a couple of the common statements: "Jim Crow practices are justified because Negroes smell bad," and "Jews should not be admitted to medical schools because they are aggressive." The first, completed, would read something like this:

There should be separate public facilities for people who smell bad.
Negroes smell bad.

Ergo

The second would read like this:

People who are aggressive beyond some determined degree should not be admitted to medical schools.

Jews are aggressive beyond this degree.

Jews should not be admitted to medical schools.

The orders of fact alleged in these two examples are quite different. But they serve equally well for our purpose. The major premise is ordinarily not stated in either case by the persons who use the statement; nor is it often stated or answered by those who oppose racial and ethnic discrimination of the kinds they refer to.

I suspect — though it might be hard to prove — that the suppression of the major premise in these and similar cases is not a psychological accident. There is said to be a kind of shrewdness in the fevered reasoning of the neurotic, as well as in that of the devil. The shrewdness in these rationalizations lies in the use of implied major premises that people of our culture, those who believe in racial and ethnic equality, as well as those who use these rationalizations, do not care to bring out into the open.

Let us look again at the syllogism about odors. We are a people who can be frightened by advertisements which tell us that we will not be promoted to be superintendents of factories and sales-managers of businesses unless we smell nice; and the American woman can be frightened by the threat that she will not get her man or that she may lose him over a matter of a little unpleasant odor of which her best friend can't bring herself to speak. We are not told at what point in his rise to authority and higher income, the man must begin to make himself pleasant. Nor do we learn whether the man, who is about to be lost, had so sensitive a nose when he got the girl, or whether he picked up this nicety later. But the reference to the great — and legitimate — American dream of getting ahead is obvious enough. And it is perhaps not difficult to understand why we do not question the main premise behind the alleged fact of Negro odor.

Or let us take the defense of restrictive covenants by the statement that the presence of Negroes in a neighborhood destroys property values. The major premise would be something like this: People are justified in preventing property in their neighborhood from being occupied by people whose presence reduces property values. Now it is true that residential property values respond in some degree, under certain circumstances, to a change in the kind of people who live in the area. This may be due to the way of living of the new people, or it may be due to an attitude toward them, or to both. It is also true that Americans in great numbers try to turn an improvement in their economic condition into an improvement in their social standing by moving to a new neighborhood. This is a perfectly natural and generally proper thing for them to do. But the trouble is that there is always some later comer treading on one's heels. So that it is, in a sense, the great American game to break in where one is not wanted. It is a game that is successful just to the extent that one seems not to be playing it: to seem to play it is to be aggressive, and one gets punished for that although he may not necessarily be rewarded for not being aggressive. Herein lies the great American

dilemma, although I do not mean to belittle Mr. Myrdal's statement of it. The thought that I may be one of those whose presence in a neighborhood might — through other people's attitudes toward me — reduce its desirability to them is not a pleasant one to face, especially when combined with my own concern lest some group of people from whom I wish to be dissociated may some day threaten the neighborhood in which I have achieved a social footing and perhaps a dearly bought family house.

The preceding paragraph contains a clue to the effectiveness of the rise of alleged Jewish aggressiveness as justification for limiting their entry to the professions. We Americans do not like to talk about just what degree of aggressiveness is proper; we might find that the amount of this virtue necessary to realize our ambitions is greater than the amount which turns it into a punishable vice. I am tempted to pursue a like analysis of what is hidden in the question, "How would you like your sister to marry a nigger?" I will spare you — and myself — that ordeal. To those of you who are still college students, I recommend it as an exercise for the brain and the spine.

Let me repeat that I do not pretend to prove that the enemies of interracial and interethnic justice exercise conscious slyness in the choice of their defensive rationalizations. Nor can I prove that it is the discomfort of facing major premises about which we are fearfully ambivalent, rather than mere logical carelessness and the love of empiricism at all costs, that prevents us from filling out these syllogisms. But certainly we are ambivalent about the principles hidden in these statements. We, like those who defend the racial and ethnic inequalities of our society, are all Americans. They and we share the same aspirations; the hidden fundament of our minds is the same as theirs. I only suggest that that gives them a certain advantage over us, and that we have allowed them full benefit of it.¹

Whatever causes it, the failure to ferret out major premises has other consequences than merely leading us on to a merry chase for facts. It leads to too much protestation as well. We counter the exaggerated statements of our opponents with exaggerations in another direction. Nearly all of the statements in favor of racial and ethnic discrimination allege faults in the minority groups in question. These faults range from serious moral defect to slight departures from the canons of good taste. In our counter-arguments, the mem-

¹For a penetrating analysis of hidden factors in interethnic sentiment, see Ichheiser, G., "Diagnosis of Anti-Semitism," *Sociometry Monographs*, No. 8.

bers of the racial or ethnic groups involved appear as paragons of virtue, delightful in their manners — better, in fact, than it is common for human creatures to be.

This brings up the whole problem of the differences between people of different racial and ethnic categories. Those opposed to racial prejudices and inequalities have shown a tendency to slight, or even to deny, the existence of any differences at all. Fishberg's book on the Jews has long served as a text to prove that no one can tell a Jew when he sees him — a very dubious compliment to Jewish parents who have put forth great effort so to bring up their children that they will respect and practice conduct which the parents consider rooted in their Jewish faith and culture. All that Fishberg says about the physical characteristics of Jews may be true; and there are occasions when statement of his or other such findings is called for. But to use them to try to prove that there are no discernible or significant differences between one ethnic, or religious, group and another can lead to no good.

In the first place, overuse of such argument implies that the only basis for social political and economic equality is the lack of differences between the groups concerned. That would put our faith in the rightness of social equality on a very dubious foundation, both because it might some day turn out that there are some differences we don't know about and because it would imply, that the price of equality is the elimination of peculiar traits which some group of people may properly cultivate and cherish. Heaven knows that in our prejudiced world members of some groups are given plenty of temptation to deny that they belong to the groups in which they were born and bred, and in so doing to eliminate all identifying marks. That is a matter for their own consciences. We can only have sympathy for such victims of racial, ethnic and religious injustice. Our sympathy should not lead us to engage in counter-propaganda which expressly or implicitly denies or tones down the differences which really exist between groups.

There is, further, the danger — so cogently stated by David Riesman in an article entitled "Equality and Social Structure," — that common people will consider the whole propaganda for tolerance a fake intended to obfuscate them. For, as Riesman says — speaking of the way into which the democratic world played into the hands of the Nazis —

That (democratic) world denied that there was any difference between races. . . . They insisted, for instance, that only the

ignorant and the prejudiced could find any differences between Jews and non-Jews, and sociologists supplemented this with statistics to show that, in all tangible ways, Jews were just like everybody else. . . . One can see now that it would have been better strategy to admit the differences while denying that they justified political and economic stratification in most cases. . . . For the differences *are* there, no less so for being subtle and impalpable, or being mostly culturally conditioned, not biological in origin. . . .

At any rate, in the eyes of the ordinary man, there were differences between races and between the sexes and between men in general. He could not always put his finger on them, but he could feel them, and feel that there was something fishy in the liberal denials.²

Riesman's warning applies not only to those differences which merely distinguish, or are supposed to, one group from another; it applies as well to those real or alleged differences which imply faults. For if groups of people maintain somewhat different virtues in their peculiar cultures, is it not likely that they will differ somewhat in their vices also? A record of the problems with which practical theologians have had to deal in different times and places, and of the special questions of conscience which have turned up in the confessional in various periods and countries, and among people of different ethnic background and social position, would — I am sure — give ample evidence of differences in the sins for which people have a predilection. In this matter, it would probably be more effective to gloss over nothing; and especially not to gloss over our own sins. The doctrine of original sin, which rests equally on all, is a sounder starting point than protestation that the groups which are the special objects of prejudice do not have any special vices. For, again speaking of our logical opportunism, the use of the denial of special faults as an argument against racial or ethnic prejudices and injustices implies somehow that we who are not discriminated against are in that blessed state because at some time or other we were without special disqualifying faults or vices, and were therefore elevated to our privileged position. It further implies the right of those who consider themselves without special faults or vices to give or withhold full equality from others.

In this kind of argument, incidentally, we again play into the hands of the enemy, for in arguing so hard that groups of people whose rights we have limited are without fault we encourage the

²*Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*, Vol. I., 1943.

idea — implicit in the "fault" justification of prejudice and limited rights — that justice and equality are something to be earned, and that the wage is to be paid by and at the discretion of the more privileged group. This argument turns up in the statement that Negroes are not ready for full political rights and for access to all kinds of jobs, supported by a false use of evolutionary ideas — "the Negroes are only yesterday out of the jungle." "It will take another hundred years," etc.

I do not mean to suggest that the problem of the relation between faults and access to full privileges in a society is an easy one, either in theory or in practice. There are circumstances in which society withdraws full freedom from an individual because of a weakness betrayed in his actions towards others. But the principle on which this is done is not that the other members of society have the right to do this because they are virtuous. They do it not in the name of and by right of their own virtue, but in the name of the good of the community and through functionaries of the law who — although they should certainly be people of uprightness and as far above reproach as possible — act with an authority delegated by society. The principles involved are far from those implied in any rationalization which justifies one group of people, supposedly free of faults, in limiting the social privileges of another whole category of persons because of the latter's alleged faults. It is some such principle that we give consent to if we answer the "fault" argument for discrimination by protesting that the minority concerned is not different in any way from other groups. It makes us parties to a revolting self-righteousness.

Allow me to mention briefly one more consequence of the denial or glossing over of differences, and especially of faults. It has already led to a feeling, in this country, that no one not a member of a certain group may express any but the most laudatory sentiments or judgments concerning it. Even those who are members of a group are enjoined to say nothing critical in such a way that it may reach ears outside the group. Again, the abuses and misunderstandings have been so flagrant that one can understand the effort to enforce a certain censorship upon criticism of one group by members of another. But that kind of tolerance which prevents statement of honest opinion and conviction is a false tolerance. It is the kind of tolerance which requires us to look about the room, and ask of our neighbor in a whisper, "Is there a Lower Slobbovian present?" before we open our mouths to speak. Granting that a careful tongue

is an organ of great virtue, it does not follow that an honest one is less to be valued.

I have made but one point, or sung but one theme, with some variations: that it is worse than of no avail to gather and disseminate the true facts which refute the alleged facts offered in defense of racial and ethnic inequality of social rights, unless at the same time we dig out and bring to our own view, as well as to that of our opponents, the major premises, or principles, which lie hidden beneath the disguise of rationalizations.

University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.

The Catholic Sociologist and the Sociology of Industry*

JOSEPH L. KERINS, C.Ss.R.

IN THE current convention of the American Sociological Society for the first time in its history there is a special section on industrial sociology. During the past year an unprecedented percentage of the articles in the *American Sociological Review* have treated of industrial sociology. The November-December 1946 issue of *Sociometry* is devoted in its entirety to the subject of sociometry in industry. These are but a few indications of the emergence in American sociology of a new area of sociological research. It is the theme of this paper that industrial sociology is a field which Catholic sociologists may not ignore, a field to which we have a vital contribution to make.

We are all familiar, of course, with the general characteristics of the impact of our modern industrial civilization on the social processes. Many social scientists, and among them prominent sociologists, have interested themselves in the social implications of the rise of an industrial culture. Perhaps the first to investigate scientifically the extent of the problem was Le Play in his analysis of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society. In his painstaking research Le Play presented abundant evidence that industry had brought in its wake social disorganization characterized by the loss of effective communication and cooperation between individuals and groups.¹ Some decades later Durkheim likewise substantiated the theory that the advance of technology had meant the regress of social unity. For instance in his study of suicide (1897) Durkheim indicates a definite relationship in certain parts of France between the growth of industry and the decline of individual participation in the group. As the technological element advanced in western culture with giant strides, the human element tended to be crushed and left behind. Society developed technological skill and skill in the organization of production, but lost was the skill in the integration of

*A paper read at the Eighth Annual Convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society, December 27, 1946.

¹Cf. specifically *Les ouvriers européens* (1855-79).

the human factors involved. Le Play and Durkheim were outstanding among professed social scientists who perceived the disastrous effects of the loss. Hardly less important was the social survey movement early in this century in England and the United States. The survey contributes much to the elaboration of the factors of social disorganization characteristic of industrial cities which hold so vast a number of souls within their grasp.

And while the practical impact on society of the rise of an industrial civilization was being investigated, there were not lacking theoretic sociological analyses, of widely divergent validity, of modern economic life. The names of Marx, Sombart, Durkheim, Max Weber, Pareto, Veblen, to mention but a few, symbolize tomes of sociological theory designed to dissect economic and social processes.

Out of this vast complexity of fact and theory one conclusion at least arises, a conclusion with which Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI have heartily agreed: social order has been disrupted in the evolution of industrial civilization: social tensions have sprung up in new areas of social life, have been intensified in old ones. Against this background of fact and theory there is emerging in American sociological circles the rather indigenous discipline, industrial sociology.

Mary van Kleeck in a recent article² discussing the origin and nature of industrial sociology, stresses the researches under the direction of Ogburn on the social importance of technology, especially in the President's Committee on Social Trends (1933) and the subsequent work of the National Resources Committee (1937). These and other industrial research projects, such as those of the Department of Industrial Studies of the Russell Sage Foundation, have undoubtedly contributed much to the development of industrial sociology. From the precisely sociological standpoint, the work done at Harvard University and the growing contribution of the University of Chicago are perhaps more important. The Harvard studies have resulted from the researches of Elton Mayo and a group associated with him at the Graduate School of Business Administration. The evolution of industrial sociology can be fairly traced through the Harvard studies: Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (1933); Tn. N. Whitehead, *The Industrial Worker* (1938); F. J. Roethlisberger & W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (1939); National Research Council, *Fatigue of Workers* (1941); J. B. Fox, *Absenteeism: Management's Problem*

²Mary van Kleeck, "Towards an Industrial Sociology." *ASR*, October 1946, 11(5).

(1943); Elton Mayo & George F. F. Lombard, *Teamwork and Labor Turnover in the Aircraft Industry of Southern California* (1944); Elton Mayo, *Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (1945).

In 1943 at the University of Chicago there was organized the Committee on Human Relations in Industry. Among the personnel of the committee are several names prominent in sociological circles, including W. Lloyd Warner, Burleigh Gardner, Everett Hughes, Wm. F. Whyte. Most of the work of this group has been reported on thus far in articles in the scholarly journals. This year they launched with McGraw-Hill Book Co., a Human Relations in Industry Series. The first volume, a symposium in industrial sociology edited by Wm. F. Whyte, is entitled *Industry and Society*. The second is to be Whyte's *Human Problems of the Restaurant Industry*.

Even this brief sampling of the current material in industrial sociology would be grossly incomplete were no mention made of the data to be found in the Yankee City Series. When *The Social System of the Modern Factory* by W. Lloyd Warner & J. O. Low is published it will no doubt be a classic in the field of industrial sociology. Worthy of mention also are two recent general treatises on problems of industrial sociology: Burleigh Gardner, *Human Relations in Industry* and Wilbert E. Moore, *Industrial Relations and the Social Order*.

The above-mentioned research groups represent the outstanding contributors to the growing material in industrial sociology. Other lesser centers of research are functioning however, for instance, under Delbert C. Miller at Kent State University, under Conrad M. Arensberg at Columbia University. J. L. Moreno and the sociometrists are likewise devoting increasing attention to relationships in the industrial structure.

A pertinent clarification of the precise nature of industrial sociology has been contributed by Delbert C. Miller in his recent classification of current research. In an article in the June 1946 *American Sociological Review*, he distinguishes five major approaches to the sociological study of work groups. "These are: 1) The Factory as a Social System. 2) The Study of Specific Occupations. 3) The Social Psychology of Occupations. 4) The Study of Interpersonal Relations in Work Situations. 5) Business as an Institution."³

³Delbert C. Miller, "The Social Factors of the Work Situation." *ASR*, June 1946, 11(3):300.

Studies of the factory as a social system revolve around the pattern of formal and informal work groups. Studies in specific occupations involve the construction of composite occupational types according to the method, for instance, of Nels Anderson's *The Hobo*. The type of research Miller would classify as social psychology of occupations concerns occupational membership as a determinant of attitude patterns. The bulk of research on interpersonal relations in the work situation consists of the application of sociometric participation-devices to work groups. Studies of business as an institution explore the behavior patterns, skills and controls developed in the social environment of specific work situations. For instance, in the article referred to, Miller attempts in one section to prepare sociometric profiles of selected jobs in terms of intensity of required social skills.

It is impossible, of course, to summarize here the content of this current research in the field. The overall picture of industrial sociology in its present stage of development is perhaps sufficiently given by delaying for a moment over the general texts written by sociologists in the field. Burleigh Gardner in *Human Relations in Industry*, for instance, discusses such subjects as these: 1) The factory as a social system, status in industry, hierarchy of seniority, symbols of status, problems of status; 2) Line of authority and communication; 3) Segmentation of the structure, patterns of interaction, formal organizations, cliques, control organizations; 4) The union, its functions and place in the structure, relations with management; 5) Wage and wage system, concepts of management and worker; 6) Personnel counseling, duties, tools, techniques; 7) Minority groups, Negroes, women; 8) Understanding social structure — a tool for executive, union leader. The symposium edited by Wm. F. Whyte entitled *Industry and Society*, has such chapter headings as these: The factory as a social system; The factory in the community; Functions and pathology of status systems in formal organizations; The motivation of the underprivileged worker; Race relations in industry; When workers and customers meet.

An obvious observation, from the mere mention of the above variety of items, is that industrial sociology at its present stage of development presents a mixture of sociological theory and industrial practice. Industrial practice does and must dip into a variety of sciences. The examples of more technical and more comprehensive research projects noted previously have, to a large degree, the same characteristic eclecticism. Current research in industrial sociology presents no very clear concept of the precise nature and limits of the discipline.

The fundamental difficulty in formulating a precise concept of industrial sociology from the available research, seems to stem from the preoccupation of the research with therapeutic objectives. Social analysis is quite different from social therapy. As a matter of fact, preoccupation with therapy can sometimes hinder objective analysis. This actually happened in the early stages of the Hawthorne studies. Roethlisberger, in one of the Harvard reports, ruefully points out how therapy warped analysis:

"During the first year and a half of the experiment, everybody was happy, both the investigators and the operators. The investigators were happy because as conditions of work improved, the output rose steadily. Here, it appeared, was strong evidence in favor of their pre-conceived hypothesis that fatigue was the major factor limiting output. . . . But then one investigator . . . suggested that they restore the original conditions of work, that is, go back to the full 48 hour week, without rests, lunches and what not. This was Period XII. Then the happy state of affairs, when everything was going along as it theoretically should, went sour. Output, instead of taking the expected nose dive, maintained its high level."⁴

The significance of group solidarity and the meaning of the situation to the group had been overlooked. The lesson for industrial sociologists should be clear. Analysis can be checked in terms of ameliorative change only when the factors involved are common to both. In industrial sociology there is a very real danger of too facile analysis of the situation under pressure of demand for "results." This emerging field of sociology needs perhaps to re-read in an industrial context, the words of Znaniecki in discussing precisely the same problem in "educational sociology":

"Inevitably, however, in this cooperation (between sociological and educational thought) practical educational interests dominate over theoretic sociological interests, and educational sociology has come to mean essentially a utilization of the results of sociology for educational purposes. . . . We believe, however, that sociological studies of facts of education should be entirely separated from discussions about the educational application of these studies and constituted into a branch of theoretic sociology."⁵

It will perhaps clarify our notions if we distinguish carefully industrial sociology from the sociology of industry. The latter has as

⁴F. J. Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 13.

⁵F. Znaniecki, *Social Actions*. (N. Y.: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1936), pp. 675-76.

its focal point not productivity, nor industrial peace, nor any such goal, but the work-group-situation. The sociology of industry must be theoretically conceived as the analysis of the social structure and processes of work groups in industry. In Dr. Miller's classification of research discussed above, for instance, we begin to see the outlines of a sociology of industry different from though by no means separated from, industrial sociology.

In thus distinguishing, however, it would be erroneous to infer a parallelism with the old "pure" and "applied" sociology. Industrial sociology has too large a proportion of theoretic content to fit into such a simplification. Furthermore, to suggest the distinction is not to imply at all that sociologists in this field should entirely ignore therapeutic objectives. The collection of data, depending as it does on observation and interview to such a large degree, demands the active cooperation of officials in industry and often their financial support. These are practical motives for an orientation toward therapy. Therapeutic objectives likewise are often of great value in this that with discrimination they may provide the scientist with an experimental laboratory for the verification of his analysis. These considerations are above and beyond the dictate that knowledge thus acquired be in some way useful to industrial society. It is quite obviously eminently desirable that sociological research in industry have pertinence regarding the removal of industrial disorders. Even though for the sociologist analysis is primary in the ontological order, in the order of time analysis and utility are of equal urgency.

In thus stressing the problem of distinguishing analysis and therapy, we ought not overlook the many other problems in the field offering a challenge to the ingenuity and scientific skill of sociologists in industrial research. There is need, for instance, for more exact terminology. The evolution of the use of the "undirected interview" has not been accompanied by a completely satisfactory method of synthesizing the pertinent data. Research is still needed on such problems as these: the extent to which status is determined by occupation and division of labor; the significance of the social controls implied in planning; relationships between industrial organization and the community; the impact of technology and industrial organization on community structure and social change; the analysis of the labor supply, quantity and mobility; collective bargaining as a stratifying social force. As *Catholic* sociologists we dare not fail to contribute to industrial sociology at the two levels indicated, that of analysis and that of therapy. To us particularly

Pope Pius XI addressed his words, in that incomparable ethical synthesis of analysis and therapy, *Quadragesimo anno*, when he speaks of not allowing social science to lie hidden behind learned walls.⁶

As Catholic sociologists it should concern us that on all the literature in industrial sociology orientated toward industrial reform, no appreciable impact has been made by the labor encyclicals. We know the contribution these can and must make to the reformation and reorganization of our industrial society. Ours is the two-fold task of integrating the social doctrine of these encyclicals with the data of industrial sociology, and of clarifying and interpreting the truths of these encyclicals in terms of that data.

The first of these tasks need not detain us here. Countless minds within and without the Church have recognized the soundness, the pertinence of these masterful critiques of modern industrial society. Of equal validity is the positive program there outlined. There is a crying need for the injection of these truths into an industrial sociology aimed at industrial reorganization and reconstruction. Despite any theoretic qualms we might have regarding the nature and role of sociology *per se*, the current industrial sociology has entered the arena. Catholic sociologists dare not be mere onlookers.

The second task mentioned above, the suggestion concerning the interpretation and clarification of *Rerum novarum* and *Quadragesimo anno* in terms of current research in industrial sociology requires some further explanation. The encyclicals are ethical documents, not directly sociological. Father Furfey adequately treated the general basis of the implied objection in his discussion of value-judgments in sociology at the convention last year.⁷ The validity of that position needs no further comment here. The point we are trying to make is not precisely the same. It is one thing to draw ethical values into sociology. It is another to utilize sociological research for the clarification and interpretation of ethical documents. It is the latter project that concerns us here. An illustration might help make that project clear. Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical on marriage says: "... Even from its beginning this union of man and woman ... manifested two most excellent properties ... namely, unity and perpetuity. ... This form of marriage, however, ... began to be

⁶*Two Basic Social Encyclicals*. (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1943), p. 95.

⁷Paul H. Furfey, "Value-Judgments in Sociology." *ACSR*, June 1946, 7(2).

corrupted by degrees, and to disappear among the heathen. . . ."⁸ Does not the anthropological evidence against the theory of original promiscuity have a direct bearing on this teaching of the Church? Catholics, it is true, do not need that evidence; but it is of some value. In much the same way, a goodly portion of the data of industrial sociology can implement the labor encyclicals.

The very heart of the papal plan for social reconstruction is Pius XI's *Industries and Professions*. The essential characteristic of the Industries (to which we limit ourselves in this discussion) is that they are *natural*. Hence, they need not so much to be *formed* as to be *recognized*, since they already exist in a true sense but are prevented from functioning. Research in industrial sociology has uncovered evidence which is of vital import in this connection, but the significance of this evidence has been for the most part overlooked by Catholic sociologists. The outstanding contribution made thus far by industrial sociology is the analysis of informal groups at the work level. Empirical research has exploded what Mayo calls "the rabble hypothesis,"⁹ the assumption that workingmen are a horde of individuals bent on money-making. On the contrary, the research is constantly turning up evidence that workers in industry tend to form well-knit, informal functional groups. Current research has analyzed definitely the spontaneous nature of these groups, the role they play in the work situation. The groups show a definite prestige-structure, and are important social controls in industry. Mayo and Lombard in the study of aircraft plants on the west coast¹⁰ have even drawn the conclusion, more pertinent for our purposes, that informal organization through "natural," "family" and "organized" groups can extend from a work center of 3 or 4, right through a plant employing thousands. In this same study, the Harvard research emphasized again the conclusion that there is no question for industry whether there shall or shall not be working groups. The problem for industry is whether these shall be hostile or cooperative. Only by recognizing these groups, by integrating them into the formal organizational set-up, by cooperating with

⁸Joseph Husslein, S.J. (Ed.), *Social Wellsprings*. (Milwaukee, Wis.: Bruce Publishing Co., 1940), p. 27.

⁹Elton Mayo, *Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization*. (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1945), p. 112.

¹⁰Elton Mayo & Geo. F. F. Lombard, *Teamwork and Labor Turnover in the Aircraft Industry of Southern California*. (Boston: Bureau of Business Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1944).

them, by allowing them to function in the work situation, only then will management attain industrial harmony.

These investigations of natural, spontaneous "primary groups" on the work level offer to Catholic sociologists an impressive array of data pertinent to the system of industries. The evidence fits into the theory of subsidiarity. There are startling possibilities for Catholic sociologists to clarify and validate the soundness of the papal plan for industry through the utilization of the available research and through the undertaking of similar research projects. It is significant that Golden and Ruttenberg, speaking for the labor movement, have seized upon this research and interpreted it as constituting "a study of the origin of labor unions."¹¹ A comparable opportunity, rather, an imperative obligation, confronts Catholic sociologists in regard to Pius XI's *Industries and Professions*.

Another area of contact between current industrial sociology and the encyclicals concerns the social nature of work. We are familiar with this basic principle and its pertinence to the system of industries, to wages, to working conditions.¹² Empirical research in industrial sociology can converge on this principle from various angles. An obvious one is that of the spontaneous growth of work groups which we have just discussed. Another approach is that in terms of social skills called into play by work. Miller, in the article already referred to in this paper, in his discussion of the social factors of the work situation, analyzes and scales these occupational skills. Time does not allow a full discussion of this interesting bit of research. Miller describes the general purpose of the study as being "to initiate research into the social nature of jobs and to find common social factors that underlie and characterize all occupations. It is possible to find such social factors and to measure the relative social skills required in different jobs."¹³ This research into the social nature of jobs provides data of direct pertinence for an interpretation and clarification of the encyclical teaching on the social character of work. The article will repay careful study in this connection.

Another interesting piece of research which can be tied in with the vital encyclical teaching on the social nature of work is a study by E. Wm. Noland concerning the factors associated with absenteeism

¹¹C. S. Golden & H. J. Ruttenberg, *The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy*. (N. Y.: Harper & Bros., 1942), p. 181.

¹²Cf. for instance, *Two Basic Social Encyclicals*, pp. 133ff.

¹³Op. cit., p. 314.

in industry.¹⁴ A portion of the study is given in an article in the *American Sociological Review* of August 1945. Noland concludes that "items measuring the attitudes of industrial workers toward various spheres of living were found to group themselves into scalable areas, each of which was significantly associated with absenteeism."¹⁵ Included in the tabulation are home situation, community situation, life organization. Since the study deals with absenteeism, it is obviously an indirect, a negative approach, as it were, to the social nature of work. But it does provide concrete evidence of one aspect of the social nature of work, namely, the tie-up between the work situation and various other patterns of social relations. This is empirical evidence of the irrationality of attempting to abstract the worker's productive situation from his social life. This evidence throws some indirect light on the whole question of the family wage taken up in the encyclicals. Social philosophy develops an argument thus: when a man devotes his work-life to a job, that job should pay him a wage consonant with a decent, normal family and community living. Such research as this by Noland points up emphatically the relationship between family and community well-being and the work situation. It is needless to point out that such a devious approach as this is not meant to make the ethical argument as such any stronger. Likewise, empirical studies such as these by Miller and Noland differ vastly in certitude and universality from encyclical doctrine. But there does not seem to be any valid reason why such lesser material cannot be used to concretize and supplement the social teaching of the labor encyclicals.

Time does not permit a further pursuit here of this technique of clarifying and interpreting encyclical teaching. A re-reading of the encyclicals in connection with the type of research discussed in this paper suggests many applications, presents many problems worthy of investigation. The whole value system, for instance, of modern industrial life receives attention in the encyclicals. The actual attitudes and values of workers have received analysis in industrial research. How do the two patterns compare? The attitudes and values of management have been less subject to scrutiny in the research. The encyclicals provide leads for the searching out of the dominance of greed, the power of the profit-motive, the role of the power-motive. Research can clarify and point up the precise social processes

¹⁴E. Wm. Noland, "Analysis in Worker Attitudes and Industrial Absenteeism: A Statistical Appraisal." *ASR*, August 1945, 10(4).

¹⁵Op. cit., p. 508.

involved in the class conflict situation delineated broadly in the encyclicals. The complex problems growing out of women in industry, the impact of technological change on formal and informal structure, the relationship between union organization and spontaneous groups in industry, the specific values needed for Christian leaders in industry and the impact of these values — these are but a few of the areas in which contact can be made between research in industrial sociology and the encyclicals.

In thus approaching encyclical teaching by way of empirical research we can reach some preliminary common ground with "hard-headed" businessmen and sceptical scholars who might shy away from a direct examination of the encyclicals. In other words, the process discussed above can work both ways. We can clarify encyclical teaching in terms of empirical research. Likewise, and more important, we can apply encyclical teaching in terms of the research. Our encyclical teaching is in harmony with these findings and can by means of these findings be injected into the contemporary scene. This latter process we have not deemed necessary to elaborate on here. It follows logically from the above discussion. There is no need to labor the point in this group that the principles of the encyclicals cannot be applied without a precise knowledge of the social situation concerned. It is one thing to know principles. It is very much another thing to know how and where to apply them. Industrial sociology can both help us to know these principles better and guide us in applying them. This application in fact, cannot be made without a knowledge of contemporary industrial social structure, and it is precisely this knowledge that industrial sociology contributes. It is this knowledge that up to very recent years has been neglected in industrial studies which gave us a vast array of economic and technological reports but failed to analyze adequately the human relations involved, the social causes and effects of economic and technological factors. Industrial sociology is well on its way toward filling that gap. But the filling may have too large a measure of quicksand if Catholic sociologists fail to make the contribution it is in their power to make.

To Catholic sociologists in particular belongs the task, in the words of Pope Pius XI, of "zealously undertak(ing) to develop, with the Church as their guide and teacher, a social . . . science in accord with the conditions of our time."¹⁶ Catholic sociologists are challenged by Pope Leo's exhortation: "Everyone according to his

¹⁶*Two Basic Social Encyclicals*, p. 95.

position ought to gird himself for the task, and indeed as speedily as possible, lest, by delaying the remedy, the evil, which is already of vast dimensions, become incurable."¹⁷ It is to be hoped that the above brief illustrations may serve to focus attention on some important contributions to social reconstruction which Catholic sociologists can make in writing about, lecturing on, and in teaching, industrial sociology.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 36.

Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

The Problem of Religious Tensions*

FRANK T. FLYNN

I SHOULD like to introduce my discussion of this important subject by setting forth certain convictions that I have as to the essential premises for a rational approach to the problem. These may be stated substantially as follows:

First, each man who espouses any religion is both a religious person and a civic person; that is, there exists a condition of dualism, wherein one and the same man has specific obligations both to religion and to the civil community.

Secondly, the civic man does and should operate in the light of his religious principles and convictions.

Thirdly, a basic civic duty incumbent upon each man is to cooperate with others in the interests of the common welfare, whenever such cooperation does not conflict with his religious convictions.

Fourthly, a necessary element in cooperation is to have a profound and honest respect for the rights of others, and it is especially important to recognize the rights of others to their religious convictions. This does not imply that "all religions are equal," nor does it mean that the forces of evil may claim protection under the guise of religion. It means simply that justice demands that we observe what Pius XII recently called "the sacred principle of equality among men."

With these premises in mind, let us turn to an examination of the problem of religious tensions today. That such tensions exist no realistic person can question. However, religious tensions are only one phase of the culture conflicts which have been an ever-present phenomenon on the American scene. Catholics in particular are familiar with the history of the Native American movement of a century ago, the Know Nothing Order which scourged the fifties, the American Protective Association near the end of the century, and the Klan in the twenties. These were merely the organized manifestations of the emotional and economic hostilities that existed — the formal groups which gave substance and meaning to the distrust, suspicion and fear which were their concomitants. These emotional

*A paper read at the Eighth Annual Convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society, December 28, 1946.

upheavals were not at all exclusively religious in their context, for it is axiomatic that religious persecutions invariably are intertwined with economic, national, ethnic, and political motives. The blurred outlines of the average man's religious beliefs have made it possible for religion to be used both as the frame of reference and as the call to battle.

Mankind has characteristically feared the stranger, and when the stranger is a real or potential rival, fear may be translated into some form of aggression, either directly by frontal assault, or indirectly by the creation of barriers in terms of social distance or economic discrimination. The history of out-group, in-group relations in this country shows a broad range of devices designed to set off one group from another, but whatever the instrument used by the dominant group, it is predicated on irrationality. However interrelated motives may be, whether the major theme be religious or ethnic, almost always reason is replaced by a symbol, or if you prefer the term, a stereotype, which Walter Lippmann defines simply as "pictures in the head." This symbol, this idea, this image is nurtured by the quaint myths, legends, and rumors which substitute for knowledge based on facts.

As a result of these distortions, men otherwise capable of intelligently weighing values may be so afflicted with an aggregate of false concepts that they form deep prejudices toward those who are different from them in race, color, or creed. If such prejudices were held by the traditional hermit, they would harm only himself. But today nobody can live in a social vacuum — all of us are bound together intimately, and we are living in what Le Play called "a suffering, complex society."

These unreasonable prejudices and the hostilities they generate may result in specific injustices toward others, or they may tend to inhibit constructive and cooperative activities. In either event, they stand as obstacles to unity and cooperation at a time when real and potential strife seems to be the order of the day, both in domestic and international affairs. Prejudices seemingly gain new strength with the onset of each crisis of contemporary existence. Perhaps this is because religious attitudes and feelings are distorted by the device of projecting prejudices that have their primary roots elsewhere into religious areas, thus giving them an aura of sanctity which they would not otherwise possess. Religion thus becomes a transmission belt, a vehicle for the expression of diverse hostilities. Often that which passes for religious differences has nothing to do with religion.

In this day and age, there is one important crisis which deserves exploration, especially because the existing religious tensions are blocking the most hopeful solution. Men of all religious faiths are confronted with the very real threat of materialism, which flourishes and becomes stronger while Protestants, Catholics and Jews attend to their own quarrelling and bickering, instead of uniting to face the common danger.

To the extreme materialist, there are no ethics excepting perhaps business ethics, which generally are not ethics at all. To such a one the only dogma is that of expediency; to him what is right is so because he thinks it is right; his only law is that of the jungle. His attitude toward the state in its relationship to the individual may be determined largely by a materialistic standard. If he is successful in worldly affairs, he is likely to be for the status quo, regardless of how things as they are may infringe on the rights of others. If he is unsuccessful, he may be equally disregardful of the rights of others by looking toward an all-powerful state which will provide justice for him, but not necessarily for others. It is true that these statements describe the extreme condition, and it must be noted that many of those outside formal religion are motivated by deep feelings for justice, but the logical evolution of materialism leads to reactionary capitalism on the one hand or to some form of totalitarianism on the other.

There is no denying the fact that in one degree or another materialistic standards are supported by a substantial segment of society, and that their virus has infected large numbers who are identified with religion in a formal way cannot be questioned. These communicable attitudes are bound up with personal pleasure-seeking, and the average individual is highly receptive to them. With success being judged in terms of how much money one makes, what clothing he wears, what wealth he has accumulated, it is not surprising that we so often see the paradox of ostensibly religious people being identified with serious social malpractices, their selfish personal goals acting as a barrier to the application of religious principles. In an era of conspicuous consumption, the standard of those who have tends to become the ideal of those who have not. As a way of life, as a guide to right conduct, religion is pushed into the background, to become a social appendage, a ritual, a folkway, useful chiefly for its ceremonial values.

Materialism tends to make either money or the state a deity, and we must recognize that what Pius XII calls "the religious anemia of

our times" is a serious threat to our kind of civilization. Religious people are faced with a common enemy, and must find some way of joining forces to counteract the conditions of the times. Professing neutrality, most materialists are neutrals in name only; many attack religion openly; others join with any religious group in a fight against another, in the belief that what hurts one group hurts all groups. Many of them interpret the First Amendment to the Constitution to mean a guarantee of freedom from religion, rather than freedom for religion, and because the greatest threat to their hedonistic existence is religion, they will use every means at hand to discredit it. It is utter folly for religious groups to help them by denouncing each other. To my mind, this is the most important aspect of religious tensions. By casting aside the principles of justice and equality in our relations with other religious groups, we help to stratify the divisions that exist, and prevent joint efforts motivated by correct principles.

The current canards about one religious group or another are too numerous to catalogue. The effects are observable. In many places, Catholics believe that there is not much to be done about community problems by them, because the Protestants (or the Masons) are running the town. In other places, Protestants are sure that a papal plot is in the making when a Catholic is voted in as county commissioner. Among both Catholics and Protestants there are many who are quite certain that all Jews should be classified either as communists or as international bankers. The attitudes involved may be more or less quiescent — and they usually are — but they flare up with agitation by the extremists, and whether the bigots are Coughlinites, or Nativists, or Anti-Semites, or any combination of these, the results are about the same in terms of intensified suspicions.

One of the most disturbing factors about this question of tensions is our seeming inability to do very much about them. Resting on emotional insecurities, and being constituted more of shadow than substance, they are difficult to eradicate. They do not yield to the most weighty intellectual appeal, largely because they have little or no intellectual content. People are not born with these prejudices — they represent a wholly acquired pattern. Children learn prejudices of all kinds early in life from their parents, and from community concepts as expressed by other children. Perhaps the problem would vanish if adults would conceal their own attitudes from children and at the same time work against concepts learned in the street.

This does not pretend to be a definitive analysis of the question, and I do not propose to offer a definitive solution. Logically, there are two basic things that need to be done by all groups involved: First, to apply the principles of charity and justice to all men; and secondly, to unite wherever possible on a common ground to further common objectives. If these two steps are taken, and taken more often, we may at least ameliorate some of the tensions present on the current scene.

As a practical matter, the calling to task of those who offend proper canons should be initiated within the group itself. Catholics should be the first to criticize inept and dishonest Catholics in public life. Too often, criticism from others is assumed to have a religious bias, which is resented accordingly, and defended against at all costs. Jews, in like manner, rather than becoming defensive when individual Jews are justly criticized, should be the first to raise their voices against the offenders. Protestants, too, must become concerned with their own group. The present lack of understanding by some of their prominent churchmen with respect to the position of the Catholic Church on the question of separation of church and state in this country ought to be remedied. To the *Christian Century*, for example, the prospect of children riding to parochial schools in public tax-supported buses is the "entering wedge for an ultimate union of church and state;" and, envisioning the same result, Bishop Oxnam has become almost paranoid about the mission of Mr. Taylor to the Vatican. Such attitudes are untenable because in this country Catholics not only regard the separation of church and state as ethically sound and a separation of the right kind, but also as one they are especially eager to maintain.

As a Catholic layman, it is appropriate that I speak more specifically about Catholic responsibilities. In my opinion, both clergy and laity are to be blamed for some of the misunderstandings which have developed in our relations with other religious groups. All too often Catholics have failed to make clear their position on vital issues, and they have refrained frequently from participating in community activities dedicated to the improvement of social conditions. This, of course, is understandable. Being a minority group generally, and living in a Protestant-dominated culture, they have naturally leaned toward isolation. Even within the Church itself nationalistic barriers have been slow to break down, and where strong Catholic groups collide, the resulting tensions make any progress difficult, even in Catholic activities.

We might as well face the fact that the attempt to wall ourselves in as a protective device will not operate successfully in the modern world. Catholics must be trained for dealing with the world and its problems, not shielded from them. The best protection is to be found in an adequate knowledge of Catholic principles, and in the willingness and ability to apply them in practical situations. Because Catholics are in contact with the community as a whole, we should recognize the inherent dangers to their religious faith, and then cope with them in an intelligent, orderly manner. The day is gone when clergy and laity in urban communities can continue to act as though they were living in a thirteenth-century village. Today parish boundaries and community limits are not the same, and consequently Catholics have responsibilities both to their parishes and their communities.

It is important that religious principles be applied to basic social problems wherever they are found. Unfortunately, many who acquiesce to the principle of justice for all treat some categories as abstractions of the metaphysical order, to which lip service only is required. The failure of Catholics to implement their beliefs, for example in racial justice, leads many to the conclusion that the principles involved are vague and uncertain. This in turn breeds suspicion and distrust.

Such isolation from reality is not universal by any means, but it happens too often, and possibly that is why the Catholic Church has been referred to as "a great conservative force," which to a certain extent is a gratuitous insult. The social doctrines of the Catholic Church have dynamic implications, but inertia and timidity mistakenly called prudence all too often prevent their use in dealing with practical social problems. This condition has been confusing to the true liberals of all faiths, and it is important that people be made to realize that "the great conservative force" has a living, constructive social doctrine which can act as a leaven in a difficult, dangerous world.

Catholics can do their share toward removing the inequalities and injustices that exist by applying the social doctrines of the Church to modern life, by cooperating with like-minded men of all faiths, but without compromise as to principle. Uniformity of action does not require uniformity of belief. The opportunities for participation with others are numerous, and they occur in many areas, such as those of world peace, racial equality, and civic reform. The recent Declaration on Economic Justice signed by clergy and laity of the

three principal faiths was a sound demonstration of the concept of working together at a common task as fellow citizens. This document, released simultaneously on October 17, 1946 by the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and the Synagogue Council, was a far-reaching statement on the moral principles underlying economic life, and served as an index to unity in an area appropriate to unity, here and now.

There is no panacea for the problem of religious tensions, but if all religious groups will apply the doctrine of justice to all and work together for a better world, we may well encourage a diminution of bigotry and suspicion, by presenting to the materialists, as well as to our own children, a common front dedicated to removing inequity and insecurity, and at the same time establishing the divine plan of a brotherhood of man and a fatherhood of God.

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.

Religious Tensions in the United States -- A Social Problem*

LEO SHAPIRO

THE problem of religious tensions is one of many which cut at the heart of human affairs. It is so much a part of human affairs that it is often difficult to give it adequate limits. It is a social problem, to be sure, and in various ways it is also religious, socio-economic, spiritual — in short, a human problem.

The problem is, indeed, so complex, so far from being susceptible to any simple panacea — whether legislation alone or socio-economic reform alone or intercultural education alone — that there are many who have permitted themselves the luxury of despair. Some of you will remember an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* for January 1944, on "How the South Feels About the Race Problem." The writer of this article took the position that no notable improvement could be achieved unless Negroes and whites understood clearly that (1) the problem is incapable of solution and (2) the issue of segregation must not be called into question. It is significant that this writer was honest enough to admit that he and those who felt like him were not deluding themselves, and that they understood that this position was "less than democracy." Some of our fellow sociologists take the same view. Many of us will long remember the abrupt dismissal of the complexities of the problem made by Professor E. B. Reuter in his study, *The American Race Problem*, in which the following statement is found: "The various methods advocated by individuals and organizations as solutions of the race problem may be dismissed with brief comment. There is no solution."

No, we must not permit ourselves to be driven to this conclusion. There are ways which we can take to lead us out of our problems, but the paths are many because the problems are multiple, not only in causation but also in solution. It is easy to be tempted by a "one track approach," and it is always tempting to be beguiled by theories of single causation and single solution. But this question is manifestly too complex for such panaceas.

*Condensed from a paper read before the Eighth Annual Convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society, December 28, 1946.

To start with the simple, we need facts about human relations, and we need the best possible dissemination of these facts. There are few questions in which there is so large a gap between public opinion and scientific opinion as in questions about human relations, whether between racial or religious or nationality groups.

Scientific evidence is important, and the dissemination of scientific evidence is valuable — but these alone will not accomplish our objectives. Even more than these, there must be the kind of insight which makes for an understanding of the patterns of segmentalization which hem us in. There must be a vision that is broader and deeper so that we can see a larger reality, and a place for us and our world in that reality. Such a vision bears a relation to knowledge, but it is grounded also on values and on emotional involvement. It is significant that the most thorough study of the Negro in America, that of Gunnar Myrdal, evolves its formulation of the problem from the American Creed based on a conception of the American ethos. Myrdal writes about the Negro, but his remarks are equally valid for other intergroup problems. They deserve our most careful scrutiny and examination. As Myrdal puts it:

"At bottom, our problem is the moral dilemma of the American — the conflict between his moral values on various levels of consciousness and generality. The American dilemma . . . is the ever-raging conflict between . . . the valuations . . . which we shall call the American Creed . . . of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations . . . where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudices against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook."

"The heart has reasons which the reason cannot know" — and those who are concerned with positive human relations must make their approach in terms of the total person, reason and heart and mind and spirit. There is much to do in a society, for example, which has so debased the great concepts of love and good will that charity (once *caritas*) and philanthropy (once *philanthropia*) have only a pecuniary signification. It is thus questionable how far we can go without a thorough re-evaluation of our value systems aimed at peace everywhere in the world and on our street. For peace begins where it has always begun — on our street.

When we say that peace begins on our street we are saying more than the casual observer may think. We are trying to ground the

universal in the particular, the abstract in the concrete. Immediately we are faced by the old question: But where shall we begin? The question, as well as the answer, is related to that other question which has been asked since time immemorial: But who is my neighbor. By now the answer to these questions should be abundantly clear. As has been indicated again and again, the time is now, the place is here, and the person is whoever happens to be present now and here.

This thesis touches on all aspects of human relations and on all aspects of the problem which we are here considering. Take the matter of employment. What we must do in a society that is concerned with progress is to utilize all the potential human resources at their best level of utilization. This means that we want to do everything possible to make it easy for the Jewish physician to make his maximum contribution to society, without having to worry about whether his religious affiliation will prove a handicap to his work. The Catholic lawyer should have the right to pursue his profession under conditions which enable him to perform his work most usefully and effectively — conditions which unfortunately are not always present. It should be obvious that to the extent that we prevent artists and scientists and scholars and workers from making their maximum contribution, to that extent we militate against the democratic idea on two levels, the conceptual and the functional. We are in the position of having made elaborate plans to set up a society making for a rich and abundant life, only to have piled up all sorts of obstacles to prevent abundance and the wholesome utilization of human resources.

Take the matter of housing. It is not very difficult to decide what ingredients must enter into the standards of adequate housing. Moreover, we know by now how directly inadequate housing is related to juvenile delinquency, broken homes, social disorganization. An elemental necessity in the more abundant life will have to be more abundant housing, good housing, without room for bad plumbing or broken windows or restrictive covenants.

The whole question of our political life deserves careful examination. We are at a time when we need wisdom from every corner. We need an informed electorate and a brilliant leadership. How absurd it is for us to close off whole avenues of potential Bernard Baruchs and Al Smiths and Walter Whites and Eleanor Roosevelts because of the myths which we have evolved about religious or nationality or racial or sexual groups. Here again, democracy must

mean the utilization of *all* potential, and we must not permit demagogues to deprive us of the wise men and women who are waiting for their chance in this or that obscure corner of our society.

The structure of our public facilities and our social life is hardly consonant with the best conception of human relations. Our hotels and summer resorts, our restaurants and country clubs have already gone a good deal farther in an anti-democratic direction than did many European countries in pre-Hitler days. It should be a matter of grave embarrassment for us when we are told by recently arrived Europeans that the "restricted clientele" signs which they see in every part of the country were never to be seen in the old days in many of the countries in Europe. It is bad enough that we have permitted things to go so far, but it will be suicidal if we assist this process by seeming to be acquiescent about it in the slightest degree. More than this, we must counteract it with all the strength and energy that we can muster.

Finally, there is the vast area of education. There is so much to be done in this area. It is not irrelevant that our teachers are fleeing into every other occupation because of the status which teachers have been given in this country. The status was based on poor labor standards as well as on bad intercultural standards. Our young people have been deprived of the great thrill of learning from great teachers because of the many absurd restrictions which were set up in the teaching profession. The criteria for teachers often have had little to do with any objective criteria of what constitutes a good teacher. School administrators have been concerned with whether a teacher smoked cigarettes, or whether he (or she) came from a particular racial or religious group, or whether he (or she) dressed according to the approved standards of Middletown — anything and everything except whether the teacher wanted above all things else to be a good teacher. This narrowness has left us a body of teachers in great part sterile in ideas, limited in initiative, and frustrated in their daily work.

Certainly a phase of this problem is the matter of student quotas in institutions of higher education. Robert Redfield has recently written a definitive analysis of this question in a brilliant essay, "Race and Religion in Selective Admission."¹ Redfield refutes one by one the various rationalizations for quotas which are usually offered by school administrators, and he points up their manifest

¹Published in the July 1946 issue of the *Journal of the American Association of Collegiate Registrars*, and which has since been reprinted by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

absurdity. It should surely be well known by now that arguments for quotas are completely unworthy of any respect for the facts of the case. Such arguments are never applied against the ethnic or religious group of the people who apply them. Redfield quotes Yves Simon, who once pointed out² that we never hear a demand that "Germans be limited in breweries, Catholics in municipal administration, Poles in symphony orchestras, Irishmen in fire departments and police forces, and whites in well-paying jobs of all sorts." Dr. Simon went on to say that he will believe, "with Pascal, in the sincerity of witnesses who allow themselves to be martyred; . . . in the sincerity of the partisans of the *numerus clausus* when they demand that their principles be applied with a rigor fatal to their own interests. Until we see white workers demanding a limit on the number of white workers in well-paid positions, we shall refuse to believe that the advocates of the *numerus clausus* are really interested in the common good and in the harmonious distribution of the various parts of the community." Simon and Redfield and other students of the problem have found that behind the rationalization is a *wish* to keep the majority group in the dominant position, and a *myth* to justify the wish by every sort of straining of logic and evidence. No one will ever be able to estimate how much genius and talent we have lost through these anti-democratic and anti-human restrictions, and we are losing such genius today and every day as long as we continue to seal off a great part of our human potential.

There is also the problem of the kind of educational materials which we use. How often one picks up a novel, play, short story, or text-book and finds stereotypes about immigrants, foreigners, aliens. The American history which is traditionally taught to our youngsters is shot through and through with a crude chauvinism and an unenlightened jingoism. The geography text-books which are usually found in our schools are pitched in terms of "good" customs and folkways (namely ours), and "funny" folkways and customs (namely theirs). Whatever is at all strange or different from "our" ways automatically becomes the subject of amusement, derision, contempt. One is reminded of the case in which the wife of a university president walked into the store of a Chinese merchant in New York's Chinatown and looked at some of the ornaments in the store. As the Chinese merchant walked to the back of the store, she murmured quickly to her daughter: "My, isn't he funny?" The Chinese quickly winked at her and said giggling: "You funny, too."

²Review of Politics for January 1945.

An edifying experience for any hardy sociologist would be to go through sociology text-books and check off the stereotypes and myths about racial, religious, and nationality groups. It is absorbing to find some of the best names in the field guilty of this kind of sociological malpractice. Or try looking in reference books which are used by youngsters in the schools — dictionaries for example. First, there are the opprobrious terms. One dictionary will have *kike*, *dago*, *nigger*; the other dictionary is too delicate to have these, but has instead *sheeny*, *wop*, *shine*. The secondary definitions are also revealing. For example, one will find *Christian* defined as "a decent, civilized or presentable person." But when one sees *Jesuit* defined as "a crafty person, an intriguer," one can be sure that no Jesuit ever gave this definition his *nihil obstat*. And then there is always the definition of *Jew* as "to cheat or over-reach by sharp practice or trickery." Or one can glance at a certain edition of *Roget's Thesaurus*, now fortunately out of print, and find under *parsimony* such "synonyms" as "miser, niggard, churl, screw, skinflint, . . . extortioner, extortionist, Jew, usurer." And while we are on this subject, we may as well mention a "synonym" which can be found of *Catholic* in one dictionary which has now revised this and other definitions; the synonym is "pickpocket."

Here is one of the many places where the work in intercultural education can be of great usefulness. There are many mistaken notions about the objectives and functions of intercultural education. Some people seem to think that it is concerned only with curriculum revision or with introducing a unit on the contributions of a particular group. Actually, intercultural education is concerned with the whole gamut of education — teacher-training, curriculum revision, educational materials, teacher-administrator relations, school-community relations, etc. Many school systems have learned how much broader and deeper this process is than they had assumed. As to objectives, it is a serious error to believe that intercultural education espouses religious indifferentism or assimilation. Its philosophy is still in process, and it is much more a philosophy of cultural pluralism or cultural democracy than anything else. We who are interested in broadening education can do much to give the philosophy of intercultural education the direction which we believe to be valid.

Out of knowledge and insight must come a genuine functional pattern of cooperation among all groups. Such cooperation cannot be brought about without knowledge and insight; but these will

die still-born unless they can find active expression in the work-a-day world. Even a casual reader of *The American Catholic Sociological Review* knows how significant a debate has ensued on the issue of participation or withdrawal. We who hope to see a world built on understanding and good-will among all mankind must not, dare not, speak of withdrawing. The world cries out for the collective effort of all who are concerned with justice and brotherhood. We can give only one answer to such an appeal: that we shall hold fast the hand of every man of good will, and that we shall move ourselves and our fellows and every force of society to usher in the peace and harmony which the world needs and must have.

We have a solemn duty to become intimately familiar with the members of the groups who make up our fellows in society, and we should not be surprised if our solemn duty increasingly becomes a pleasure as we come to know the admirable men and women who are sealed off from us because of the prejudices which prevail around us. We often say that familiarity breeds contempt. In the field of individual and group relations, it may be more true to say that unfamiliarity breeds contempt, and that we have a better knowledge and love of our neighbors as we get to know a larger and more varied group of them.

Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, New York, N. Y.

Sociological Implications of UNESCO*

JOHN D. DONOVAN

IT IS a fact of more than casual significance that the orientation of social thought among the peoples of the world is still largely political and international in character. The various national problems of poverty, crime, unemployment, housing and many others have either reappeared in the postwar world or have assumed a new and greater significance. Still, the language of the people reflects both deeper fears and greater hopes than can be properly associated with these alone. Like many a preceding generation, the impact of war has served to broaden the horizon of their interests and to challenge the hierarchy of their values. What is crucial now is the founding of a world society which can solve the "problem" of peace. To this situation the blueprint provided by the constitution of UNESCO charts a path of significant meaning. In truth, it is still little more than a blueprint and the path which it indicates has had little travel. Yet these factors of themselves do not minimize the vital role for which it has been cast in the social engineering of world peace and security. Accordingly it is both legitimate and necessary to submit to sociological analysis the implications present to the structure and role of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Frankly, this paper will largely be of a theoretical nature. In this our choice is conditioned not only by the futuristic orientation of UNESCO as an agency for world peace but more importantly, by a desire to assemble the often isolated concrete facts within a framework which "makes sense." On an eminently practical level, the structure of such an approach serves to minimize the areas within which unscientific evaluations or "prophecies" can be introduced. In the analysis of an organization so delicately geared to human hopes and fears as is UNESCO, such procedure seems indicated.

The dominant general proposition is this: the sociological implications of UNESCO can be most profitably derived on the levels of a structural and situational analysis. The theoretical postulate basic to such a proposition relates the structural form of a social organiza-

*A paper read at the Eighth Annual Convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society, December 27, 1946.

tion to its functional content and to the situation of action immediately relevant. Or to state the correlation somewhat differently, it defines the range of implications to those deriving from the internal requirements of the social structure and from the social situation in which it resides. More specifically, we will here be concerned with the goal-implications present to the bureaucratic structure of UNESCO and to the social conditions upon which it depends.

Bureaucracy and UNESCO

Structurally the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is a specialized agency designed to function within the wider framework of the United Nations. As such it shares the over-all objectives of the parent organization and in its separate capacity implements the program to achieve world peace and security. The Preamble of UNESCO's Constitution affirms this status and defines its major goal when it states, "Since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." Thus, positively, and in a sense never before recorded in an official document, the primacy of political and economic arrangements as a basis for a lasting peace is subordinated to the fundamental need for "the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind." Moreover, as steps in the direction of these ultimate goals, UNESCO stresses the dangers of ignorance and defines as necessary the elimination of world illiteracy, the wide diffusion of culture and education, the free exchange of intellectual advances and the end of nationalistic literary and historical prejudices. Perhaps, parenthetically, its goal can be described as peace propaganda on an international scale.

The truly significant point of this goal orientation of UNESCO is the affinity of its spirit to the historical tradition of the bureaucratic process. Thus, with Max Weber it is pertinent to note, "Bureaucratic organization has usually come into power on the basis of leveling of economic and social differences. . . . Bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy in contrast to the democratic self-government of small homogeneous units."¹ Again, in another context, he relates the manifold tasks of the so-called 'policy of social welfare' to the growth of bureaucratization and states, "The democratization of society in its totality, and in the modern sense of the term, whether actual or perhaps merely formal, is an especially favorable basis of bureaucratization, but by no means

¹H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (trans.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 224.

the only possible one."² This identification of the goals of UNESCO with the tradition of bureaucracies implies at the outset that the fact of UNESCO's bureaucratic structure is not of itself the critical point at issue. On the contrary it is here affirmed that such an organizational structure is positively indicated by the character of UNESCO's goals and by the scale of the enterprise which their attainment involves. The crux of our structural analysis rather centers on the implications which bureaucratic procedure involves for UNESCO as a combined association of nations and of intellectuals.

It is a fact of contemporary as well as historical observation that the wide spread acceptance and success of the bureaucratic type of organization can be referred to its sheer superior efficiency in "getting things done." Characteristically, the attainment of this virtue has been based on a division of labor which involves specialization of function, an hierarchial ordering of authority, an emphasis on rational "matter of factness," internal discipline and a spirit of compromise.³ In a word, bureaucratic procedure and bureaucratic personnel have a distinctive internal orientation to action, contemporary prototypes of which include the large scale business organization and certain sections of government activity.

UNESCO, however, can only be obliquely compared to these latter forms of large scale enterprise since its procedural norms involve a rationale simultaneously political and intellectual. Moreover, it is in the compound character of its values that the most significant implications of bureaucracy for UNESCO procedure and personnel are to be found.

No fundamental problems are posed by the internal division of labor and necessary specialization of function, but within almost all other areas of the "pure" bureaucratic procedure, traditional values associated with intellectual activity invoke normative complications. Thus, and it is by way of a basic distinction, the governmental and intellectual character of UNESCO presents within the same structure an ambivalence of value patterns. This is summarized by Charles A. Thomson, a State Department Adviser, when he observed, "But in matters of mind and spirit government is feared as a somewhat heavy handed instrument. In the last analysis government rests on authority, on force. But the advances of education, science and culture

²Ibid., p. 231.

³T. Parsons, *Structure of Social Action*. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1937, p. 506.

depend primarily on freedom."⁴ It follows from this that the wedding of various governments to an educational program sponsored by intellectuals represents a union of May and December values. One might hope that the marriage will endure its incompatibilities but according to Merton, "the honeymoon of intellectuals and policymakers is often nasty, brutish and short."⁵

On a more specific and concrete level, the implications of this value dichotomy — present in an unique way to UNESCO — can be traced to the requirements of bureaucratic procedure and to the conflicts of values between intellectual and policy maker. Merton's analysis of the role of the social scientists in the war bureaucracy of the government does just this and provides an invaluable touchstone for comparison.⁶

The procedure characteristic of public or political bureaucracies is based on a rational "matter of factness" which is primarily concerned in "seeing things done." Accordingly, the policymaker in the fulfillment of his function defines the problem area, establishes the conditions of work, fixes alternative procedures, sets a deadline and assigns the "experts" to work. In terms of efficiency pure and simple, the values of such procedural norms are not insignificant but to the intellectual in his role as "expert" they constitute sources of multiple frustrations. On the one hand, his "professional view" is forcibly circumscribed and directed to areas outside the limits of his interest or competency. Again, he may be denied the necessary time to investigate the policy or problem posed and still be expected to submit a recommendation with calculable results. On a somewhat different level, the "common sense" knowledge of the policy maker may challenge the competency of the intellectual and result in a rejection or a distortion of his scientific advice. Finally, unless he succumbs to the cumulative frustrations imposed upon his bureaucratic role as expert and withdraws from the organization, he may be gradually transformed into a "technician" whose role is to serve whatever strata happens to be in power. Upon this last decision he surrenders autonomy and accepts the constraints of the bureaucracy.⁷

The parallelism of these implications to the bureaucratic structure of UNESCO is clear. In the main, its intellectuals are professional men and women of education and science whose universal orientation

⁴Charles A. Thomson, "The Role of Government in UNESCO," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Sept 13, 1946, 90 (4):303.

⁵R. K. Merton, "Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy," *Social Forces*, May 1945, 23 (4):414.

⁶*Ibid.*, *passim*.

⁷*Ibid.*, *passim*.

to scholarly pursuits differs widely from that required by a bureaucracy. Indeed, the role dilemma of the intellectual in UNESCO is further accentuated by the totality of his person which is involved. Here he is not only a professional man but also a citizen of a national state. The frustrations attendant upon bureaucratic procedure may be heightened by those deriving from political loyalties with only a surrender of the one or a distasteful compromise indicated. In only a very limited sense can the UNESCO intellectual enjoy the freedom of cultural expression which might construct the defenses of peace in the minds of men. On the contrary, the implications of its bureaucratic structure tend to deprive UNESCO of the strength of intellectual autonomy and to make of it primarily an association of governments. To this eventuality MacIver has declared that "the creative opportunity of UNESCO would be shackled from the start."⁸

Social Situation and UNESCO

Social structures, however, precisely because they are social, do not function in vacuums which preclude the influence of other than internal forces. On the contrary, the existence, development and consequences of social structures are dependent in large part on the character of the external situation to which they are exposed. Parsons has pointed to this relationship more specifically for present purposes when he wrote, "it (bureaucracy) is dependent on the existence of rather special social conditions, the absence of which may constitute a very serious barrier to its development, no matter how great the objective need."⁹

In the case of UNESCO, the objective need for world peace and security coexists with a social situation of highly complex character. It is clearly impossible to analyze here the relevance of all or even a majority of the important social conditions, but perhaps suggestive of their general tone are the implications situationally present to the solidarity of UNESCO's organization.

The generalized hypothesis in terms of which the contemporary situation may be viewed follows Sorokin's analysis of the sources of social solidarities and antagonisms. He notes, "The combination of a basic similarity in the main values of the parties concerned, with a supplementary diversity in their secondary values is the most conducive to solidarity relationships. . . . An opposite and diverse character of the values of the parties, when they are considered important

⁸R. M. MacIver, "Intellectual Cooperation in the Social Sciences," *Proceedings*, etc., *op. cit.*, p. 312.

⁹Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 507.

(positively or negatively) and in which the parties have no common systems of values and norms, is the most conducive to the generation of intense antagonism."¹⁰

Perhaps it would be premature to venture at this early date in its history an application of these principles to the value similarities and dissimilarities present to UNESCO. Perhaps one can hope that man's love of peace which is indisputable will surmount the diversity of values which exist and in Viscount Cecil's dictum "constitute an 'organized and concentrated international opinion'."¹¹ Undeniably this is the goal of UNESCO but if present events cast an accurate shadow the realization can only partially be attained. The non-participation of Russia and her satellites, the Yugoslavian eulogy of dialectical materialism, the compromise selection of an atheistic Director-General — these facts have meaning which can only derive from a fundamental diversity of basic values. It may well be that UNESCO has been born before its time, that the 'evolutionary' background is not yet broad enough or deep enough to receive it. Whatever the case, the implications of social conditions for UNESCO are not inconsiderable and pose problems which materially concern its development and solidarity.

Finally, it is evident that the blueprint of UNESCO is susceptible of implications on many different levels. In a sense it constitutes a laboratory of world dimensions whose very existence, structure and designed functions cover a wide range of sociological interest. As an agency for social change, as a solvent for cultural differences, as an instrument for intellectual growth, as a stimulant for research — it represents a structure deserving of specialized study.

Here, to summarize briefly, UNESCO has been viewed as a distinctive social structure which is significantly conditioned by its internal bureaucratic character and by the external social situation present. The implications for UNESCO on both these levels of analysis have not been insignificant. If UNESCO is to succeed in more than an elementary degree, if it is to actuate the blueprint which it possesses, then it must learn to speak a prose which recognizes the internal complications of its bureaucratic structure and can overcome the dissimilarities of its social situation.

Fordham University, New York, N. Y.

¹⁰P. A. Sorokin, "The Roles of Similarity and Dissimilarity in Social Solidarity and Antagonism," *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*, Fall 1944, 3(1 & 2).

¹¹Quoted in J. O. Hutgler, "Sociological Postulates Underlying World Organization and Peace," *Social Forces*, December 1943, 22(2):129.

NOTES OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTEREST

American Catholic Sociologists

WALTER E. BROWN, S.J.

THE purpose of this article is to present a short resume of the findings that were obtained from a study of the 178 American Catholic sociologists, whose names appear in the original *Who's Who Among Catholic Sociologists*.¹ The completed version of *Who's Who* was published in the October 1946 edition of the *American Catholic Sociological Review*.

The biographical data for this study was compiled by Clement S. Mihanovich, head of the department of sociology at St. Louis University. In February 1946 Mihanovich sent out questionnaires to almost 400 members of the American Catholic Sociological Society and non-member Catholic sociologists. The following article is based upon a study of the 178 Catholic sociologists who replied to the questionnaire.

The study that was made of these 178 questionnaires concerned the following facts about the American Catholic sociolo-

gists: their birthplace, present state of residence, mobility, age, education, teaching experience, fields of specialization, the number of learned and professional societies they belong to, the number of periodicals they contribute to, and the number of books they published. This article, however, will present only the most salient facts concerning the above topics, together with a few words of interpretation of the data.

The first question of interest is that of residence. Table I gives us the present residence of the group.

TABLE I

Section	Male	Female	% of total
New England	10	3	7.28
Middle Atlantic	22	11	18.48
East North Central	45	23	38.08
West North Central	17	13	16.80
South Atlantic	1	2	1.68
East South Central	0	1	.56
West South Central	1	1	1.12
Mountain	1	2	1.68
Pacific	4	2	3.36
Washington, D. C.	14	5	10.64

¹This study was made to fulfill the thesis requirement for the M.A. degree in Sociology granted at St. Louis University. The results of this study were displayed in placard form at the American Catholic Sociological Convention at Chicago.

The twenty-six page reprint of the "Who's Who" carries several additional names.

Thus it can be seen that the geographical division which is the home of the greatest number of the American Catholic sociologists in our study is the *East North Central Division*. This division includes the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

If we employ the geographical division of *East and West of the Mississippi* we find that 55 or 32 per cent of the American Catholic Sociologists studied were born west of the Mississippi, while 123 or 68 per cent originated east of the Mississippi.

In terms of present residence there are 51 or 29 per cent of our group west of the Mississippi, and 127 or 71 per cent east of the Mississippi.

It is interesting to note that one-ninth of the 178 American Catholic sociologists here listed were born in foreign countries.

In regard to the mobility of our group, the states that had the highest net gain in individual Catholic sociologists were the District of Columbia, which claimed one Catholic sociologist born there, but which now has 19 resident Catholic sociologists; Illinois whose numbers rose from 18 to 30; New York which advanced from 16 to 20.

TABLE II

State of Life	Number	% of total
Priests	73	41.00
Brothers	4	2.24
Sisters	47	26.32
Lay men	38	21.28
Lay women	16	8.96

The religious number 124 or 69.56 per cent of the total, while the laypeople account for 54 or 30.44 per cent of the total. Furthermore, the marital status of these lay people shows a total of 24 men and 2 women married, while 14 of each sex are single. In addition, the average years of marriage for the lay people is 18.95 and the average number of children they have is 1.9.

Table III represents the ages of the group studied.

TABLE III

Age	Number	% of total
Under 35	37	20.7
35-45	73	40.9
45-Over	61	34.1
Unknown	7	4.0

Table IV indicates the education of the Catholic sociologists studied. Rather than simply list the degrees that the American Catholic sociologists have, it would be better to contrast the number of those holding degrees from Catholic schools with those holding degrees from non-Catholic schools.

TABLE IV

Degrees	Catholic	Non-Catholic
A.B.	125	18
B.Ed.	0	1
B.S.	3	3
Lic. en Politiques et Soc.	2	0
LL.B.	3	3
LL.D.	0	4
LL.D. (hon.)	3	0
M.A.	118	23
M.Ed.	1	1
M.S.	1	1
M.S.S.W.	5	0
Ph.D.	61	23
Ph.L.	3	0
S.T.B.	4	0
S.T.D.	4	0
S.T.L.	15	0

We find, therefore, that Catholic schools outrank non-Catholic schools in the number of degrees that they have conferred upon American Catholic sociologists. Of the more important sociological degrees we find that our group possesses 141 M.A.'s, 2 Lic.'s en Politiques et Soc., 5 M.S.S.W.'s, and 84 Ph.D.'s. It is rather difficult, however, to discover from the data assembled just how many of the above mentioned M.A.'s, Ph.D.'s, etc., are really qualified degrees in

sociology. One can safely say that of the 178 Catholic sociologists studied 53 with Ph.D.'s are teaching sociology. There are also nine members of our study who are at the present time engaged in graduate studies.

Table V indicates the teaching experience and fields of specialization of Catholic sociologists.

TABLE V

Years Taught	Number	% of total
Under 5 Years	26	14.6
5-10 Years	45	25.2
10-15 Years	18	10.0
15-20 Years	27	15.1
20-25 Years	22	12.3
Over 25 Years	11	6.2

Unknown	8	4.5
None	21	11.8

Table V indicates that 39.8 per cent of the group studied has taught under 10 years, 37.4 per cent has taught from 10-25 years, while one-ninth has not taught at all.

In view of the above data quite a complete picture is had of the American Catholic sociologists whose names appeared in the original "Who's Who in the American Catholic Sociological Society."

St. Louis University
St. Louis, Mo.

COMMUNICATIONS

Another Letter . . .

To the Editor:

In your issue of October, 1946, you publish a communication from me together with a rejoinder by Dr. Paul H. Furfey. He has replied to my letter with his customary courtesy and competence and I have no desire to continue the discussion except to clarify a misunderstanding which is apparent from Dr. Furfey's letter.

I completely agree with Dr. Furfey's statement that: "A sociologist may study his subject as *non-quantitatively* as the geologist studies his and yet be a first class scientist." (Italics mine). The phrase, "as non-quantitatively" is precisely at the root of the whole controversy. I have never denied the status of biology and geology as sciences. But I have contended and must continue to insist that the scientific generalizations that constitute the body of these sciences are, without exception, quantitatively arrived at in the sense that they are the result of the observation of *numbers of cases*. This has always been my central contention regarding quantification in science (See *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 54-58; *Social Research*, first edition, 1929, pp. 17-21). My numerous references to methods yet to be developed would itself constitute a refutation of the contention that I have ever said or implied that such methods as I myself or Dr. Dodd have used constitute the *only* permissible kinds of quantification. If Dr. Furfey was actually under the impression that I had taken such a position, I certainly do not blame him for objecting to it. I am glad,

therefore, to take this opportunity of reassuring him on that point.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

Head, Department of Sociology
University of Washington
Seattle 5, Washington

. . . And Another Rejoinder

To the Editor:

The point at issue is somewhat confused because Dr. Lundberg speaks of science as "quantitative" in the two following, quite distinct, senses:

(1) Science is quantitative in that its generalizations are based on a *number* of observed instances. Thus Dr. Lundberg says: "Scientific generalizations . . . are, without exception, quantitatively arrived at in the sense that they are the result of the observation of *numbers of cases*" (his letter, this issue). "The scientific validity of the *generalizations* of biology . . . rest upon confirmed *observations* (plural)" (his letter, *ACSR*, Oct., 1946).

This seems to me a rather weak, even trivial, sense of the word "quantitative." One might as well say that oil painting is a quantitative discipline because a painter uses a definite number of brush strokes to cover a definite number of square inches of canvas and consumes a definite number of hours and minutes in doing so.

The statement that "scientific generalization is always and necessarily quantitative" (Dr. Lundberg, *ASR*, 1:44, Feb., 1936; *Foundations*, p. 54) is true in this weak sense of *inductive* generalizations and the context shows that Dr. Lundberg

refers to generalizations of this sort. However, it is not true of all the generalizations of science without restriction. For example, it is not in general true of the generalizations of logic (traditional or symbolic) and logic is admittedly a science, albeit a formal science. One could multiply instances.

(2) Science is quantitative in that its results must be stated quantitatively. Thus, on p. 24 of his *Social Research* (2nd ed.) Dr. Lundberg approves the statement that "for the more exact descriptions required by science, the quantitative statement is necessary." Professor Dodd has attempted to organize as much as possible of sociology in symbolic and quantitative terms and Dr. Lundberg refers to "the more rigorous symbolism [of Dodd's work] in terms of which societal behavior will ultimately have to be described if that accuracy and verifiability which science insists upon is to be attained" (*Foundations*, p. 120).

I find it hard to reconcile these statements with the viewpoint implied in Dr. Lundberg's present letter that sociology can be a first-class science and yet be no more quantitative than geology. I think any neutral scientist would agree that geology is, generally speaking, pretty thoroughly non-quantitative (in sense two).

I agree that sociology, insofar as it is inductive, must be quantitative

in the weak sense (sense one). That is true — but rather trivial. I do not agree that sociology must always and necessarily be quantitative in the strong sense (sense two). I do not agree that a methodology like Dodd's, frankly inspired by physics, is either the best or the only or even necessarily the most promising method for sociology. That is the sole point at issue.

In reply Dr. Lundberg seems to argue that because all science — he should have said "all inductive science" — is quantitative in sense one, therefore sociology should be quantitative in sense two. I find the argument unconvincing. If he prefers an extremely quantitative sociology (in sense two), let him do so. He has a perfect right to his value-judgment. But let him not claim that he is forced to do so by the inexorable laws of scientific logic.

Lest my discussion with Dr. Lundberg should give a false impression, I must repeat that my respect for him as a sociologist is profound. Almost alone among American sociologists he has tried to state his definitions, his postulates, and his methods frankly and clearly and to follow them out consistently. That is no small merit!

PAUL HANLY FURFEE

Catholic University of America
Washington 17, D. C.

NEWS OF SOCIOLOGICAL INTEREST

The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues will bestow upon the individual or group contributing the best action-related research in the field of the social implications of atomic energy the Edward L. Bernays Atomic Energy Award, consisting of a \$1,000 U. S. Government Bond.

All research published or completed in 1947 will be eligible for consideration. Manuscripts reporting such research but which have not yet been published are solicited by the Society's Committee of judges. All reports, in duplicate, must be in the hands of the Chairman of the Committee, Dr. David Krech, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, not later than November 1, 1947.

★ ★ ★

A new quarterly journal, *Human Relations*, will make its appearance in April 1947. It is announced jointly by the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, London, England and the Research Center for Group Dy-

namics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. *Human Relations* is described as a "Quarterly Journal of Studies toward the Integration of the Social Sciences."

Correspondence about its policy, contributions and subscriptions should be addressed to *Human Relations*, Research Center for Group Dynamics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 39, Mass. A year's subscription is \$7.00.

★ ★ ★

The Friendship House Summer School of Catholic Interracial Techniques opens its second year at St. Joseph's Farm, Marathon City, Wisconsin. There are two terms July 6 to 19, and July 27 to August 9. For further information address James Quinlin, Dean, St. Joseph's Farm, Marathon City, Wisconsin.

★ ★ ★

Trinity College (Washington, D. C.): Eva J. Ross will lecture this August at the Summer School of the Catholic Social Guild in England.

BOOK REVIEWS*

Editor:

EVA J. ROSS, *Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.*

Introductory Sociology, Second Edition. By Raymond W. Murray, C.S.C. New York: F. S. Crofts & Company, 1946. Pp. xii+990. \$4.50.

This title is labelled a "second edition" of the well-known and widely used text of this author issued in 1935. This designation is not quite accurate as the book has been almost entirely re-written with so much additional material that the second is about twice the size of the first book. Materials that were somewhat less than integrated in the former text, e.g., Part III, *Primitive Man and His Culture*, have been more compactly, logically and pertinently presented in the present edition as *Man's Cultural Heritage*, with the ethnological and anthropological data brought up-to-date. As stated in the Preface, "the book is adaptable to either a semester or a year's course." Book One, dealing with the general subject could be used for a semester introductory course and Book Two would fit requirements for the course commonly called "Social Problems," though this text handles the subject with less emphasis on pathology and more on the social process itself. This arrangement follows very closely that of the revised Sutherland and Woodward, Ogburn and Nimkoff, Gillin and Gillin, and the Kimball Young texts.

Over the 1946 Christmas vacation our students were asked to study the chapters and topics covered in class lectures. They report that Father Murray's style is clear, delightful, facile. It is only fair to note that the comments were made by students who had read widely in most of the introductory texts mentioned above during the weeks we waited patiently for this book. Unlike some of these other texts, there is no "padding" of superfluous material. Some may regret that Father Murray did not see fit to use diagrams, graphs and pictures, but this could not be condoned at the sacrifice of any of the precious text material. Furthermore, additions of this kind would probably have made the book unduly large without commensurately adding to the enlightenment of the reader.

*Members who wish to review books are invited to write to Miss Ross, stating their special fields of interest. Specific books should be asked for, if possible, with full details of title, author, and publisher. These should be of recent publication and within the scope of sociology or a closely allied subject.

As with the previous edition, the teacher can feel secure that he is putting into the hands of his students a book that is at once up to the minute scientifically and thoroughly in accord with the ageless teachings of the Church. Up to now we have had few texts that acknowledge the existence of the large and growing literature by Catholics in this field. This author has read widely and co-ordinated superbly an enormous amount of materials by both Catholic and non-Catholic writers. He makes frequent reference to the pages of the ACSR. His bibliography is an answer to the question so many of the members of our Society have raised. The carefully selected list of books cited at the end of each chapter as "Readings" is a liberal "minimum essential" for a working college library. Mendel's Law and the brief treatment of statistics which were incorporated in the previous text have been relegated to an appendix which also includes the Clipping Essay and the former Study Guide supplement of 1937, revised for the new edition and listing provocative discussion topics. This last feature is a particularly useful one for the classroom.

The Index seems fairly adequate. It might not have been amiss to list "soul" even in a sociology title, especially when it is discussed in the text implicitly throughout and explicitly, for example, on page 769. The format, type, arrangement, etc., are modern and attractive. There are a few typographical errors, one of major proportions on page 795 where the third and first lines are inverted. It is to be earnestly hoped that the "text-bookish" title will not confine this valuable synthesis of science and faith to the classroom. It should be found on the desks of every intelligent Catholic, and persons outside the Church can find here a lucid, authoritative and very readable presentation of the Catholic position on a wide range of hotly contested social problems.¹

SISTER MARY LIGUORI, B.V.M.

Mundelein College, Chicago 40, Ill.

Sociology. By Richard T. LaPiere. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946. Pp. xiv+572. \$3.75.

The author's interest in collective psychology on which he has written other books is evident in this one. Also obvious is his ability to write fluent prose. The subjects covered are those usually to be found in introductory textbooks, and there are useful bibliographies and references. With a certain weariness one discovers, however, that this book, even more than many another contemporary sociology text, contains a heavy dose of propaganda masquerading behind a self-righteous facade of scientific impartiality. Whatever happens not to square with the author's positivistic prejudices is labelled folklore, myth, magic, or superstition.

¹Most of our professional members will regret that Father Murray has marred the value of his otherwise excellent text by coming out so expressly in favor of "Catholic" sociology, without stating that many of us prefer not to use the label. — *Book Review Editor.*

The following are some of the views propounded in the name of sociology. Religion is mostly mythology and conscious or unconscious fraud. The "will of God" has always been invoked by pigheaded religionists against the evident findings of scientists (p. 3). Philosophical speculation is based on nothing more than folklore (p. 4). In twenty-five centuries of philosophizing the philosophers have contributed nothing to an understanding of society (p. 4). Plato believed there is nothing in the human mind that predisposes men to be selfish and greedy (p. 6. Cf. Plato's *Republic* IX, 571 for a contradiction of this statement). While Plato was a radical, Aristotle was a conservative who flattered Athenian leaders in politics and economics, anxious to maintain the existing state of affairs. Because his philosophy flattered the important men of his day, he was highly regarded by the Athenians (p. 7. They proved it by forcing him into exile!). "The Aristotelian doctrine of the inevitability of things social. . . . Thus if poverty is inevitable, the rich need feel no blame for the lot of the impoverished and would be foolish to attempt to improve it" (p. 9. Cf. Aristotle's *Politics* VI, 3, 1320 a 33, which flatly contradicts this statement by advising democratic leaders to alleviate poverty and provide lasting prosperity!).

Of the scholastic philosophers, Thomas Aquinas was the most skillful, because "with his magic anything that the Church might do or say was 'true,' no matter what evidence there was to the contrary" (p. 11). To blame criminals for crime, politicians for chicanery, irreligion for immorality, is a puerile form of "folk" thinking in terms of cause and effect, which must be replaced by the "scientific" concept of multiple and interdependent variables (p. 32). The idea of "human nature" is a "misnomer" and the "naturalness of human nature" is a "folk idea" dear to philosophers like Aristotle and McDougall, but not to be taken seriously (p. 45). "In the first place, human nature is not an entity, something that an individual has or fails to have, like straight teeth or curly hair. In the second place, it is anything but natural" (p. 51). This makes one wonder by what remarkable procedures of "scientific" observation and inference Professor LaPiere discovers that there is a class of entities styled "human beings," since he talks about "no two human beings ever being exactly alike" (p. 51, reviewer's italics).

On page 55 the author's prose loses some of its felicity and fluency in the following high-flown statement: "When as a consequence of malfunctioning of the socializing processes, any considerable number of members of a group are hypomotivated, i.e., less than normally motivated, in respect to many aspects of life (and in terms, of course, of the normative levels of motivation for that group), the vigor of the society diminishes, the established social practices of some of them fall into disuse and in extreme instances the population numbers decline and the standard of living falls off. How enlightening is it to be told that the decline of the Greek city-states or the Roman empire "involved a gradual increase in the number of hypo-motivated individuals" (p. 55)? This sounds very much like the bad so-

called 'thinking' of the Middle Ages" which displeases Professor LaPiere because it "involved the use of such empty words as 'angel' and such concepts as that of the divine right of kings" (p. 58). The divine right of kings is not a medieval doctrine at all but belongs to a later age, especially the Reformation, as could be learned from Carlyle's *Mediaeval Political Theory in the West* or almost any textbook history of political thought). In the Middle Ages, says LaPiere, the Church resorted to every possible means to check the rise of science (pp. 309 and 331), and made Christianity into a "totalitarian ideology" that parallels Nazi totalitarianism (p. 309).

This review has restricted itself to mentioning some of the most questionable statements in the book, though others could be added, such as the idea that all sickness is contagious (p. 129). It would be much more agreeable to be able to say pleasant things about it, but candor compels one to protest when prejudice and disregard for facts parade in the guise of science and objectivity. If comparisons are to be made between our society and that of other periods, and if our students of sociology are to be truly cultured, our college sociology curriculum must include the history of social philosophy, with precise learning on what Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and others had to say. Our students must not be exposed to the uninformed generalities of the type contained in this textbook.

From the angle of teaching technique, the book seems to be too long for a one-semester text, and too short for the usual two-semester course. Despite the easy reading, students will undoubtedly find it difficult to gather the exact facts and theories which are so essential in the instruction of beginners in a science of any kind. Re-written, with attention to teaching need and scientific objectivity, the book has many good features which would turn it into a worthwhile text.

EVA J. ROSS

Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.

Outline of Social Change and Progress. By Carle C. Zimmerman. Cambridge 38, Mass.: The Phillips Book Store, 1946. Pp. ii+64. \$1.75.

Outline of the Future of the Family. By Carle C. Zimmerman. Cambridge 38, Mass.: The Phillips Book Store, 1947. Pp. v+128. \$1.75.

Outline of American Rural Sociology. By Carle C. Zimmerman. Cambridge 38, Mass.: The Phillips Book Store, 1946. Pp. iii+55. \$1.75.

Outline of American Regional Sociology. By Carle C. Zimmerman. Cambridge 38, Mass.: The Phillips Book Store, 1947. Pp. ix+122. \$1.75.

Here are four mimeographed course outlines issued by Professor Zimmerman for the use of Harvard sociology students, which will be of interest to sociology teachers and students generally. The first

outline is concerned with "types of ideas of desirable social change which have dominated Western Society since the end of the classical period of the Roman Empire," and includes the theories of Spengler and Toynbee, and a list of handy definitions which may be useful to beginning students.

The *Outline of the Future of the Family* is a preview of a book scheduled for publication by Harper later this year, and a considerable elaboration of the material given in the *Outline of Family and Civilization* (reviewed in the ACSR, VII, 2, p. 147). Zimmerman foresees a break-up of the family unless we analyze more carefully what produces a good family, and especially what is a good family, and conduct further research in the field.

The last two outlines amplify and bring up to date the material previously published in the Sorokin-Zimmerman *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*. Copious bibliographical references to regional novels and other works will make the *Outline of American Regional Sociology* useful to geographers as well as sociologists.

In all but the *Outline of American Regional Sociology*, the connection between history and theory is well brought out, as also the connection between one historical age and another. Zimmerman's familiarity with the classics, the church fathers, and other writers of the past will interest those for whom sociology is more than a cataloguing of facts about past or present social life. The outlines are suggestive of ideas, whether one agrees with them or not, and a well-informed instructor with some original ideas of his own could use them to advantage.

EVA J. ROSS

Trinity College, Washington 17, D. C.

Up from the Ape. Revised edition. By Ernest A. Hooton. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. Pp. xxii+788. \$5.

This revision of Professor Hooton's well-known book, first published fifteen years ago, is divided into six parts. The first three parts ("Man Relations," "The Primate Life Cycle," "The Individual Life Cycle") except for occasional changes are substantially the same as the original. Since "the finds of fossil man since 1931 exceed in number and importance all that has been made in the whole period before that date" (p. vii) Part IV, "Fossil Ancestors and Collaterals," is almost entirely new. It gives a good account of the recent Keilor, Florisbad, and Swanscombe findings as well as new interpretations of the older and better known fossils. The chart of man's family tree differs considerably from that of the first edition.

Part V, now entitled "Heredity and Race," is except for the section on physical tests of race almost entirely new. A Part VI, "The Anthropology of the Individuals," has been added, also an appendix on "Elementary Anthropometry." Part VI presents new material, including a somewhat detailed description of the Sheldon system of somatotyping and temperament analysis. The book is comparatively nontechnical and "popular"; yet Hooton seems to feel that it will not be read very widely outside of academic circles.

Teachers of sociology and general anthropology will find *Up from the Ape* an exceedingly useful reference book. Students will enjoy its breezy style. Many topics which are included even in most introductory sociology courses — the social life of apes, subhuman intelligence, the nature of race, miscegenation, blood types (including the Rh factor), and body build with reference to temperament and disease — are treated authoritatively. Although evolution is taken for granted the evidence is presented objectively. Certain weaknesses in the evidence, such as those found in the recapitulation theory, are pointed out. Those of us who have objected to the eugenic theories advocated in some of Hooton's books will be glad to find that he lives up to the promise made in his Preface, "I have kept this book clear, for the most part, of biological preachments. I have done enough of that elsewhere (and mostly to deaf ears)."

Sociologists will regret to learn that the traditional explanation of sex determination must be altered. "Recent studies, especially of *Drosophila*, seem to show that the determination of sex itself is not a simple matter of XX chromosomes for a female and XY for a male. . . . It is thought that there are genes in all the chromosomes that make for masculinity or femininity" (pp. 429-30).

Although he is disposed to accept the recently announced giant-jawed *Meganthropus* as antecedent to *Pithecanthropus*, Hooton questions Weidenreich's classification of the molars of *Gigantropus*. He differs with Weidenreich's latest opinions (*The Skull of Sinanthropus Pekinensis*, 1943; *Apes, Giants and Man*, 1946) likewise in that he attaches considerable importance to both the Piltdown and Swanscombe fossils. In this last respect Hooton's views are more in agreement with those of Howells (*Mankind So Far*, 1944) and those previously held by Weidenreich and reported in the reviewer's *Man's Unknown Ancestors* (1943). Yet in Roy Chapman Andrews' popular and oft-reprinted *Meet Your Ancestors* (1945) Swanscombe is ignored, Piltdown is presented as an enigma, and *Gigantropus* is accepted according to Weidenreich. Such differences of opinion among writers of only one nation in the short space of three years serve to remind us that as yet man's course "up from the ape" has not been completely charted.

RAYMOND W. MURRAY, C.S.C.

University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind.

Mexico South. By Miguel Covarrubias. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946. Pp. xxviii+427+viii. \$7.50.

This book by an amateur sociologist, written after about twenty visits to the isthmus of Tehuantepec, stimulates some general thoughts about sociology and sociologists. Why are books written by professionals on foreign countries so rarely gratifying? Why are these books so often confused by mistaking the intrinsic feature of the phenomena which they describe?

The answer, I think, should be that, in sociology, large groups of facts do not mean anything. They only get their meaning from

the reference frame to which they are referred. A low literacy rate, for instance, has a different meaning in countries like the U. S. and Brazil. The fact, certainly, would have to be interpreted as a negative if occurring in the U. S., but it might turn out to be a positive for Brazil. It remains to be proved that the ideal of general literacy is an absolute value. In six thousand years of human history it was not considered as such, and became only a "must" about the middle of the last century. An industrialized civilization needed a type of labor that can read, write and calculate. The value of general literacy, then, is a dogma; its value is obvious only in our civilization.

It is this dogmatic approach, I think, that makes so many professional books on foreign countries unreadable. They are even getting more and more unreadable the more scientific they get. And this is necessarily so, as it is this reference frame the validity of which has to be established first.

I therefore welcome an amateur sociologist like Mr. Covarrubias. He is at once an artist and sociologist. The combination is an ideal one. An artist can leave the world in which he lives behind and get to the center of a foreign world which makes that world look like an animated one. An artist also will perceive what is beyond the reach of scientific methods. In other words, an artist who is sociologically trained, can present, besides those facts which are measurable, also those which are not. He can balance measurable and unmeasurable facts, and thus achieve what is called a picture.

Mr. Covarrubias has given us a picture of Tehuantepec, and a wonderful one. It is almost the first book on that unknown region. There is, as Mr. Covarrubias himself remarks "in the mass of information an interpretation concerning this southern Mexican region virtually nothing about this immensely important narrow strip of land." This book is the first in treating the religious, racial, archaeological, historical, artistical, agricultural and industrial questions of that forgotten and most beautiful land. From the mere sociological point of view the book has several high merits. Yet the sociological aspect is not the only one under which this book should be read. There are scores of discoveries which a sociologist without artistic feeling would hardly ever been able to make. There are also some drawings and colored plates by the author, and some very beautiful photos.

It is true, not every page and sometimes even not every chapter is delightful. Mr. Covarrubias, unfortunately, talks also about religion and politics, and it is obvious that he has not been able to bring certain ideas to their ultimate conclusions. Yet it does not matter. We need books like this one. Schliemann, too, was an amateur when he started the excavations of Troia, and his mistakes were probably even more numerous. The fact that not everything is done well cannot impair the grandeur of the vision, and the love and understanding with which this work was started and finished.

It is likely that this book will produce scores of monographies on Tehuantepec. May those who come after Covarrubias correct

the mistakes he has made. His will remain the merit to have discovered Tehuantepec for the sociologist. LEON L. MATTHIAS
St. Michael's College, Winooski Park, Vt.

Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science. Vol. I. New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute — Yivo, 1946. Pp. 319. \$4, but available only to libraries and schools.

This first volume of *Yivo* is a translation of Yiddish scientific papers by diverse authors, from 1940 to date. It runs the whole gamut of Jewish interest: religious, psychological, historical and social. A second volume is to appear later in 1947.

The scope is beyond strict sociological interest but will be most useful as a source of sociocultural data of the Jewish minority in America, although the authors themselves purport to cover "every major Jewish settlement and significant phases of 2000 years of Jewish life."

Some articles of special interest to the present day are those on Jews in Poland, the state of Jewish schools in Palestine, the origin of the word *ghetto*, the history of the Frankfort ghetto, and the psychology of the Jewish child, and the Jewish student at Yale.

Although primarily designed to interest American Jews and to provide a scholarly Jewish viewpoint on current and recurring topics of Jewish interest, the volume is nevertheless of great value to anyone for whom minority groups are a vital study, since it provides a Jewish expression in English on so many current and disputed issues.

JEAN F. HEWITT

National Catholic Welfare Conference, Youth Department,
Washington 5, D. C.

Chinese Family and Society. By Olga Lang. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946. Pp. xv+395. \$4.

In the present work Olga Lang has given us an excellent, complete and up-to-date study of the Chinese family.

Like most contemporary studies of China, the present one is centered upon the great problem: "The transformation of old China into new China, of a static agrarian society into a modern dynamic society. . . ." (p. ix) Here is the most critical area of cultural change in the world today. When ancient, traditional ways are adjusted to modern techniques, can we save what is human out of the past?

The study analyses the structure and functions of the Chinese family, its internal structure based upon the authority of the father; arrangement of marriage for children without their consent; the inferior position of women; the institution of concubinage; the economic activity of families, from the small peasant unit of three or four people eking a bare living from rented land, to the rare "joint" families where hundreds live in wealth.

The distintegrating forces of modern life are then shown in motion. Children go off to work in industry; fathers leave their fam-

ilies behind, their wages being too low to support a family in the city (p. 86); and exceptionally large number of industrial workers are women (p. 103).

But more disruptive are Western ideas of independence. They caused discontent with traditions and led to demands for reform. A new marriage code of 1930-31 proposed to base marriage on the consent of the parties and improve the status of women. But ignorance, the inertia of ancient institutions and the scarcity of women have led to disregard of the new code. Nepotism, rooted in family loyalties, is breaking under the pressure of industrial efficiency. While youth, free from the tyranny of traditional family ties, pledge loyalty to the nation and work to bring the benefits of modern life to their own people.

Perhaps her zeal for modern family ways led Miss Lang to exaggerate the trials of Chinese family members. Bitterness, jealousy and oppression, the fruits of marriage without consent and the price of family solidarity, are normal features of family experience. But the genuine love of parents and children receive due attention. The concern of children for parents now blocks the transition to isolated conjugal families (p. 144); and parents still consider children the great blessing of human life, even among the upper classes where a high birth rate is almost unique in the world (p. 147).

China's problem is to retain the stability of family life in the past and adjust it to the demands of the dynamic society of the present. Miss Lang thinks it can be done if the family system loses its compulsive features. "Woman, who will achieve full spiritual and economic equality with man, will not need a husband as provider but solely as a companion in a spiritual and bodily union which contribute to her happiness." (p. 342) Miss Lang is aware of the weakness of a liberal family system. "Nevertheless, compared to the old patriarchal family, the modern Western family has certainly secured more well-being for its members. . . ." (p. 343) This is the very question to be answered. American families offer no ideal of genuine happiness and security. Large numbers of divorces occur among women who "achieved full spiritual and economic equality with man." "True individual love" is proving too fragile a support for life-long marriage.

Not all compulsive features need be removed to give family members a richer human happiness. LePlay's studies, *Les Ouvriers Européens* give ample evidence of patriarchal families where freedom is neatly balanced with control, mutual love with acceptance of sacrifice. A few changes in China's system would preserve the solidarity of a genuine family system and permit the happiness of true spiritual freedom. Miss Lang suggests as much in her conclusion.

There are undertones of admiration for the Soviet system which gives the impression of propaganda. Miss Lang should have stated more clearly (p. 218) that Russia had to abandon Soviet ideals of marriage and reassert traditional values in order to maintain security.

Every available method was used in the study to gather information revealing the nature of China in the past and the condition

of China at present. The literature of the field was covered extensively and with care. The result is a valuable source book of economic and sociological data, well organized and easy to handle.

JOSEPH P. FITZPATRICK, S.J.

Boston 18, Mass.

The Wisconsin Prisoner. By John Lewis Gillin. Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1946. Pp. 266. \$3.

In this study the Professor Emeritus of sociology of the University of Wisconsin succeeds well in his limited objective. His purpose is to give us a profile map of the social and economic factors in the lives of a fair sample of the murderers, sex criminals (of certain classes), and property offenders in the Wisconsin State Prison at Waupun. The problem the author sets himself is, "Do the three classes of offenders have the same or different backgrounds and personalities? Do the prisoners and their non-prisoner brothers have the same or different backgrounds and personalities? What do the individual case histories reveal regarding the bearing of these differences on the conduct of the prisoners?"

The men studied numbered 486 of a total inmate population of about 1700. The study began in 1930, data being compiled largely from prison records cross-checked as thoroughly as circumstances allowed. Wherever possible (in 172 cases) comparison was made with non-prisoner brothers, in a search for explanation of the crime.

Although there was considerable overlapping in the profiles of the three classes of prisoners studied, Dr. Gillin was surprised at the differences that appeared in the background factors surveyed. However, such a disparity in the cases of men convicted of such different classes of offenses would not seem too surprising. Moreover, the percentages of property and sex offenders imprisoned are so much less than that of murderers that a considerable element of chance is likely to impair the value of comparative background statistics of the several types.

Dr. Gillin complains that criminology and penology have "too long been descriptive rather than scientific." He hoped through the use of statistics to obtain results having the validity of natural science. At several points, however, he expresses doubt as to the significance of certain data. Moreover, his commentary on the etiological factors in the personal histories of his prisoners, and his appraisal of their critically different conduct from that of their non-prisoner brothers would seem to owe little to his comparative statistics. He seems, therefore, to give us in this book two almost independent studies. And the second, that of the common sense commentaries on case histories, seems the more valuable. The author's general conclusion to his entire volume also gives little evidence of indebtedness to his painstaking statistical compilation. It seems much more likely the fruits of common sense informed by ripe experience.

This suggests the rather disconcerting though consoling thought that we already know much more about the factors which make for

conduct normalcy and those which make for crime than we are putting to much practical use. Dr. Gillin finds drunkenness, sexual promiscuity, and obviously ill-advised marriages constantly recurring factors in crimogenesis. And yet what sustained protest is being raised against the attractive portrayal of the use of strong drink in magazines and movies? What cooperation is given to efforts to lessen seductive attacks upon public sexual morals? What encouragement is given to movements to teach the sanctity of marriage and the home?

In his conclusion Dr. Gillin gratifyingly dissociates himself from the too many present day criminologists who scorn the aid of religion. He declares that "religion properly presented is a powerful solvent of life's difficulties and religious workers can be quite as effective social workers as judges, probation and penal officers, and parents and teachers."

It is interesting to note in passing that only one sadist at most was found among the prisoners studied. A corrective of the modern fad of finding such everywhere, even (or especially) among the guards.

J. E. COOGAN, S.J.

University of Detroit, Detroit 21, Michigan

Penology from Panama to Cape Horn. By Negley K. Teeters. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946. Pp. xiii+269. \$3.50.

This is a contribution to the literature on penology in South America. We learn from the author that, with a few exceptions, the conditions are bad in Latin American penal institutions. But Dr. Teeters has written more than a critical work on penology; he has combined his penal studies with something of a travelogue through South America.

The first chapter on "Latin American Penal Practice" is a good, critical survey. In the following eight chapters are outlined the conditions that prevail in Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. A short chapter on "Inter-American Cooperation in Penology" concludes the book.

The factual matter of the work is well organized and well stated. It is a rather dark picture he paints, but there are rays of light on the horizon, for new practices are being introduced in most of the countries. It is too bad that Dr. Teeters was in a hurry, and it must have been a handicap not to have been able to speak the languages of the countries visited. He makes little effort to understand the work of the Sisters in the institutions that they run for delinquent girls and women. Perhaps the religious groups are somewhat behind in their dealing with the various individuals given over to them, but in most instances they need funds and support. The author can rest assured that the Catholic Church neither approves of nor winks at the method of dealing with sex problems in the prisons of Colombia. Furthermore, his Freudian training gives him a peculiar slant on the so-called "guilt" complex introduced. An-

other example of the writer's lack of understanding of the people in the countries he visited is the foolish statement that "sacerdotal vanity" built the churches of Ecuador. It was the faith of the people.

Perhaps it would have been better if the author wrote the story of his travels in a companion volume. It adds little to the story of penal conditions in South America. However, in a field so little known, it is a contribution.

RALPH A. GALLAGHER, S.J.

Loyola University, Chicago 11, Illinois

Social Institutions. By J. O. Hertzler. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1946. Pp. xii+346. \$4.

Taking account of developments in research and theory since his previous book with this title was published in 1929, Professor Hertzler has attempted an essentially new presentation. Footnotes, selected bibliographical items, and the text itself attest to a conscientious search for new materials and various revisions in points of view. Yet the method, avowedly eclectic, remains the same. Eschewing the task of constructing "another 'system'" of institutional theory, Hertzler holds it more desirable to make "some effort at systematizing and synthesizing the vast body of existing and more or less related conclusions and findings regarding institutions" (p. 6).

Unfortunately, this book, like its predecessor, proves that such an effort is doomed from the start, since existing theories of institutions are not merely divergent in their approaches to the subject, but are contradictory in their premises and conclusions. This is illustrated rather glaringly in a chapter on "The Causes and Functions of Institutions," in which Linton and MacIver are grouped with Sumner and Keller, Phelps, Lundberg, and Barnes as emphasizing interests as the causes of institutions (pp. 32-36), though the former define an interest as an object of consciousness, the others in a quite different sense as an instinctive or fundamental need. Throughout, Hertzler's eclectic tendency leads him to shift frames of references without explicit recognition and hence without critical examination or possible resolution of conflicting views.

The consequence of this approach is to prevent the emergence of a clear concept of a social institution. The foreboding is grim when, in the first chapter, as in his earlier work, Hertzler professes to find a plan in the "mighty maze" of extant definitions, and to derive from it "some sort of composite conception" (p. 3). The working definition which follows may be included here as a fair summary of his theory:

"Social institutions are purposive, regulatory and consequently primary cultural configurations, formed, unconsciously and/or deliberately, to satisfy individual wants and social needs bound up with the efficient operation of any plurality of persons. They consist of codes, rules and ideologies, unwritten and written, and essential symbolic organizational and material implementations. They evidence themselves socially in standardized and

uniform practices and observances, and individually in attitudes and habitual behavior of persons. They are sustained and enforced by public opinion, acting both informally and formally, through specially devised agencies" (p. 4).

It is apparent that this definition embraces conclusions of a wide range, drawn from at least two distinct empirical sciences — psychology and sociology — and from metaphysics. Only a philosophic treatment would provide the possibility of adequate integration. Philosophic propositions or the author's value-judgments are in fact introduced frequently, as in the following statements: "... most of the fundamental institutions are direct outgrowths of man's elemental nature" (p. 30); "The prime justification for anything which is is its functioning" (p. 39); "The oncoming generation should be permitted freely to choose the institutional forms they desire to embrace" (p. 277); "Efficient operation under present conditions should be the only reason for the allegiance of its adherents and the only claim upon public favor" (p. 277). In spite of these and similar postulates the author's frame of reference was not intended to be philosophical.

In keeping with the working definition and innumerable paraphrases of it scattered throughout the book, the institutional order is virtually identified with the entire cultural order. From this point of view, "a group's culture is largely a summation of its institutions, and its institutions are largely an embodiment of its culture" (p. 47). How, then, does an institution differ from, say, a mere custom? It is suggested that it *usually* has greater "conceptual clarity and rational and practical content" and is *usually* on a higher level of consciousness (p. 161), but one searches in vain for a specific difference. How is the institution related to the group? Note the answer: "while the associations and organizations come into and go out of existence in endless succession, whereas the institution is a *continuum*, these selfsame organizations are at any given time the human groups embodying the institution. . . ." (p. 62). The same institution, only different groups? Then, is the institution somehow independent of the group's culture?

A brief review does not allow a fuller elaboration of these fundamental weaknesses in Hertzler's presentation, nor mention of some points well made. Though carefully organized, the theory offered is inadequate. In addition to the objections noted, moral relativism is implied, as in other standard texts in this field. Numerous oversights in proofreading must also be mentioned.

C. J. NUESSE

The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

Small Communities in Action. By J. and J. Ogden. New York: Harper and Bros., 1946. Pp. xix+244. \$3.

Under the sponsorship of the Extension Division of the University of Virginia, Jean and Jess Ogden have traveled throughout the southeastern part of the United States studying experiments in demo-

cratic living made by small communities. In some cases they have been able to revisit these communities a year or two afterward to report on later developments. The programs studied are varied. They include economic, political, health, educational and recreational experiments.

Cooperatives and credit unions play a large part in many of these accounts. In some cases a ghost town has been transformed into a thriving community by the development of cooperative poultry raising. In devastated mining and timber sections people have turned to farming, aided by the cooperative purchase of farm machinery. In Tyrrell County, North Carolina, the establishment of a credit union made it possible for a Negro couple who had borrowed five hundred dollars from a loan company and repaid four hundred dollars in interest without lowering the principal, to regain financial stability. Perhaps the inclusion of some experiments that failed might have added as much to our knowledge. However the authors are quite frank in discussing many of the difficulties that arose. In one case the effort to establish a new form of county government brought about considerable conflict. The attempt of one community to retain a library after the withdrawal of W.P.A. funds also resulted in a contest with the vested interests.

Amongst the most interesting programs were those dealing with the problems of rural health. The abolition of the hook worm infection in an extremely inaccessible section of Alabama is an excellent indication of what communities can do to help themselves. 86 percent of the girls and 88 percent of the boys went barefoot all year. There was no economic possibility of everyone's being provided with shoes. Yet through a program of education in sanitary facilities, mainly through the high school, the rate of infection dropped from 51 percent to 1 percent.

Indirectly the book is a study of problems in rural sociology but its emphasis is on what the community itself can do to solve the problems. This is not meant to imply that communities should not seek the aid of state and federal agencies. In fact in many of the communities studied the assistance of these agencies was fully utilized. One of the fundamental requirements for community self help appears to be a more thorough acquaintance with various government agencies and the assistance they are equipped to render.

This book is not theoretical. It is based on actual studies made in the field. It contains detailed accounts of how projects were initiated and carried out. With one exception, however, it does not include any discussion of race relations which is one of the basic problems in the South. The authors did study both White and Negro communities and reported on both programs. Indirectly the problem of the Negro is implied in some accounts. In one case the Negro is denied access to a public library because of segregation laws and at the time the town was unable to open the Negro library. A temporary set-up is afforded him in a high school. What communities in the South are doing to improve race relations would have been

one of the most interesting topics in such a study. Perhaps the authors will attempt this in some future work.

JOHN J. KANE

St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia 43, Pa.

Religion et Education. By Rev. R. Kothen. Paris: Casterman, 1946. Pp. 66. Belgian francs 35.—.

This brochure tackles a number of knotty problems in a very brief space and so cannot reasonably be expected to do more than outline the salient points. The excessive departmentalization of the present era of scientific specialization has the effect of "atomizing" man's problems and rendering education confused and contradictory. The ancient role of the Church, as the educator par excellence of the masses, is pointed out as the answer to the need for an infallible, authoritative and unifying force in the world.

Sociologists, will perhaps be most interested in the author's comments on Emile Durkheim's theory that education is eminently sociological. Studied from the "social fact" viewpoint, it can be observed that systems of education vary with each country, and that these systems are the products of society itself. Hence his argument that "each society considered at a given moment in its development, has a system of education which is imposed on individuals with a force generally irresistible" (p. 23). Father Kothen's answer is to present, not only the past effects of Christianity as the educating influence of the world, but to urge a broad concept of Catholic education through the penetration of the masses of Catholic Action.

JEAN F. HEWITT

*National Catholic Welfare Conference, Youth Department,
Washington 5, D. C.*

Industry and Society. Edited by William Foote Whyte. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1946. Pp. vi+211. \$2.50.

To the rapidly growing library on industrial sociology the addition of this first publication of the Committee on Human Relations in Industry of the University of Chicago merits general attention. It is the outgrowth of a series of lectures presented in the summer of 1945 by members of the Committee and other specialists and purports to bring to the research "a well-integrated point of view and methodology" (p. 3). Stated in brief form, this emphasizes the values of empirical research in the factory and in the home "directed to the understanding of the social structure and the way in which it controls and molds the individual" (p. 3).

More specifically, the separate studies which comprise the Committee's brief report direct attention to three key ideas, namely, the recognition of the factory as a status system closely related to the status system of the community, the formal and informal patterning of intra-factory relationships, and the problems of social equilibrium and its maintenance. Gardner's chapter on "The Fac-

tory As A Social System" and Warner and Low's section on "The Factory in the Community" introduce the analysis to two of these central points while the problems of social equilibrium and its maintenance are variously treated in Hughes' chapter on race relations, Davis' study of the motivations of the underprivileged worker, and Whyte's brief description of some of the personnel problems within the restaurant industry. The contributions of Starr on the role of unions and Harbison on the economic aspects of industrial conflict are equally informative but their divergence from the sociological framework of the series tends to isolate their studies. Of greatest interest to this reviewer was Chester I. Barnard's more substantial and thought provoking analysis of the functions and pathology of status systems in formal organizations. The discrimination here introduced between functional and scalar status, the analysis of the functions of status systems with respect to individuals and to co-operative systems, and the description of the disruptive tendencies inherent in status systems — all go beyond the more prosaic treatments of this subject and provide conceptual tools which helpfully organize a still unwieldy mass of discrete information.

In general, the level of the other contributions is below that of Barnard's and provides little systematic information which is not more adequately treated in earlier works in the field. It is in no sense a pretentious study and can most adequately be used to acquaint the general public and the sociologically uninitiated with the importance of human relations in industry. To this end a selected working bibliography is appended. The specialist will find the work suggestive rather than definitive but in its overall content it serves to establish a framework for the study of the relationships between industry and society and to foreshadow more specialized studies presently underway.

JOHN D. DONOVAN

Fordham University, New York 58, N. Y.

Twentieth Century Political Thought. Edited by Joseph S. Roucek.
New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. Pp. xii+657. \$6.

This is a collection of twenty-eight essays of varying length and value written for this volume by as many authors. The editor has made no obvious effort to be systematic in the choice of subjects and none to be orderly in their presentation. For this reason, the most practical way to use this book (it is intended as a textbook of supplementary reading) would be through the rather comprehensive index. The bibliographies, both in footnotes and at the end of each essay, will also be useful.

At this point, however, a sharp warning must be given. From internal evidence of the essays themselves and from the dates of the books cited, it is clear that the essays were written from six to seven years ago, though only printed in 1946. For this reason the student of contemporary political thought will look in vain, for instance, for the explanation of such a vital and currently important movement as Christian Democracy. It is true that in the essays on

France, Italy and Spain he will find some scattered indications which, pieced together, will afford some inkling of the nature of that movement. But of the movement itself there is no independent treatment, yet in 1946, and earlier, it had already become one of the two great dynamic political forces in Europe. The same criticism could be made of the treatment, or its lack, of postwar developments of Russian Communism, and to a lesser extent of Socialism.

There is a strong sociological cast to many of the essays, and indeed to the volume as a whole. In fact, it may well be that the book will be much more useful in classes of sociology than in those of politics. This may be due to the apparent fact that, with some exceptions, the writers were not assigned a topic but were allowed to make their own choices. To be fair, it must also be admitted that this characteristic of the book would broaden the horizons of the student of politics, if he could find the time and afford the high price. As was said, there is a good index, and a fair bibliography, up to 1941; the typographical errors and misspellings of proper names are too numerous to mention here.

WILFRID PARSONS, S.J.

The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

The Myth of the State. By Ernst Cassirer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946. Pp. xii+303. \$3.75.

After establishing a name for himself in his native Germany whence he was exiled by the Nazis, Professor Cassirer taught philosophy in Sweden and was later invited to the United States to teach at Yale and Columbia. Following shortly upon his impressive *Essay on Man* comes this his last book, *The Myth of the State*, finished just before his death in 1945. Like many another believer in the 18th Century ideals of reason and humanity, Cassirer was shocked by the apparent ease with which great masses of educated people jettisoned rational and humane principles in favor of the crude mythology mingled with some of the modern political systems. He is struck by the contrast between our reliance on rational thought for the solution of problems in natural science or technology and the recourse to myth and magic by men when they are confronted by social and political problems. In a study of the nature of myth Cassirer concludes that it is a collective desire personified, a symbol created by society for the purpose of objectifying emotions and feelings.

Cassirer traces the history of man's efforts to overcome mythical thinking in political life from the Greeks through the Christian and medieval world, through the Renaissance and Machiavelli, to the age of the enlightenment which defined progress as the triumph of reason over myth, and the Romantics with whom there is a reversion to mythical thinking. The last section of the book is devoted to a study of the contributions to modern political mythology made by Thomas Carlyle's "great man" theory of history, Gobineau's race theory, and Hegel's deification of the state. Cassirer is careful, however, to note that all three held views which in important re-

spects differed from the modern totalitarian ideologies. Carlyle was no imperialist. Gobineau believed that all races, including the Aryan, would be the victims of an inexorable process of degeneration. Although Hegel exempted the state from moral rules, he yet tried to give to art, religion, and philosophy an independent value not subordinate to the state.

Cassirer's book prompts one to the reflection that myths are bound to replace rational thought whenever reason is denied its rights by being arbitrarily restricted to an excessively narrow field of operation. This happened when religious and philosophical thought fell into disrepute with the advent of the mathematical physics of Galileo and Newton. Ever since that time men's minds have been haunted by an ideal of science which excludes philosophy and religion from the field of genuine knowledge if it does not crudely identify them with myth and magic. With Kant modern philosophy advertised its despair of being able to understand the world and chose to base human life on a set of non-rational, indemonstrable postulates which could only be believed but not known with certainty. It was inevitable henceforth that someone should discover that life is based on make-believe and should give us a "Philosophy of the As-If" (Hans Vaihinger), or a study of the rôle of myth in social change such as Sorel gave in his *Reflections on Violence*. Neither of these are mentioned by Cassirer, though they contribute much to an understanding of modern political myths. One of the necessary defences against the invasion of mythical thinking is the re-admission of philosophy and theology to the generally recognized status of sciences which form part of the edifice of genuine human knowledge. So long as men are forbidden in the name of science to listen to philosophy and theology, they will always have a receptive ear for myths which promise answers to their questioning minds left unsatisfied by the kind of replies that modern science can give.

A few criticisms suggest themselves. Cassirer overlooks the rôle which Averroist Aristotelianism played in preparing the way for Machiavelli's thinking. This influence is plain in Marsilio of Padua's *Defensor Pacis* which in almost the same terms as those used by Machiavelli accused the papacy of being the greatest obstacle to the unity of Italy. In saying "in medieval philosophy a right of open resistance against the ruler could not be admitted" (p. 105), Cassirer forgets that John of Salisbury in his *Policraticus* defended the lawfulness of tyrannicide. He is reading the "duty of passive submission" of the Reformers back into the middle ages. Later in speaking of Machiavelli's amorality he says: "no thinker before Machiavelli had undertaken to teach the art of these crimes. These things were done, but they were not taught" (p. 150). Yet, there is a chapter in Aristotle's *Politics* (bk. 5 ch. 11) which describes by what means tyrannies are preserved, and this might well have served Machiavelli as a model for his *Prince*. Cassirer is embarrassed when speaking of medieval thought. At one moment he seems to admit the distinctiveness of medieval thought which was so deeply influenced by Hebrew and Christian ideas, then again he denies any

originality to medieval speculation (p. 78ff.). He opposes Hebrew "voluntarism" to Greek "intellectualism" and makes these responsible for an unresolved conflict in scholastic philosophy. In the scholastic theories of knowledge he sees only an eclecticism of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic ideas. To St. Augustine he attributes a Platonic theory of reminiscence which St. Augustine explicitly rejected in his *Retractions*. Cassirer interprets the existentialism which Thomas Aquinas discovered in the self-revelation of God to Moses in *Exodus* 3, 13f. ("He who is sent me," "I am He who is") in a voluntarist sense when he says of God "His essence is his will" (p. 92). His characterization of the scholastic conception of reason as blind and impotent when left to itself and without illumination by faith (p. 95f.) fits the Protestant Reformers' description of reason better than that of the medieval theories of knowledge.

ERNEST F. KILZER, O.S.B.

St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn.

Three Worlds: Liberal, Communist and Fascist Society. By N. S. Timasheff. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1946. Pp. ix+263. \$2.75.

Dr. Timasheff distinguishes three levels of study in the social sciences: descriptive (or ideographic), generalized (or nomographic), and normative (or social policy). In this present volume he has attempted to delineate and compare three generalized types of society, the liberal, communist, and fascist.

It would seem impossible to generalize about communist society because there is only one such society, the Russian. Communist society, however, is fashioned according to a rigid ideological system. Great as the deviations from this ideology are in practice, the system itself is meant to be applied in much the same way everywhere. Moreover, it is being applied outside of Russia today, although Timasheff does not include these emerging imitations of the Soviet pattern in his study.

Fascist society presents more suitable data for a generalized study. The fascist system was introduced, in whole or in part, in no less than thirteen countries from the time of its inception in Italy to its downfall in the countries forming the Axis powers during the war. Fascism is well worth studying as a system. It arose as an alternative to communism in the wake of the failure of liberal societies to meet the challenge of the political and economic dislocations following the first World War. It combined nationalism with social reform, whereas communism took the older course of socialism by combining internationalism and social reform along class-lines.

Liberal society straddled on both issues, that of nationalism *versus* internationalism and social reform *versus* laissez faire. The best representatives of liberal society, Great Britain and the United States, achieved considerable success in applying democratic political methods to the solution of economic and social problems through State-regulation, thus averting either a communist or a fascist revolution. But in the face of the extreme nationalistic expansionism of

fascist countries, they failed to solve the dilemma of nationalism versus internationalism.

The war has created an entirely new "constellation of forces." Fascism has been disposed of, at least for the time being. But in the process, and largely through the persistent incapacity of liberal society to apply its power effectively on an international scale, the weakness of communism in its attempt to penetrate into other countries has been transformed into great strength.

Turning to the third phase of social study, the normative, Timasheff suggests four conditions of survival for liberal society. Whether it will supply these conditions is not at all sure. But the issues are clear.

The author has packed an unusual amount of information into this small volume, and has organized it very systematically. The chapters which sketch the general features of fascist and liberal society are especially valuable on the sociological side. The characteristics of liberal society require filling out, however, both sociologically and politically.

ROBERT C. HARTNETT, S.J.

The University of Detroit, Detroit 21, Michigan

Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West. A Source Book. Prepared by the Contemporary Civilization Staff of Columbia College, Columbia University. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. Volume II. Pp. viii+1188. \$5.

The second volume of this source book (of which the first volume was reviewed here in October 1946) presents readings to illustrate western civilization from the age of romanticism down to our own time of the Nuremberg Trials and the United Nations. As in the first volume the selections range over the fields of economics, national and international politics, social criticism and reform, ethical ideals, science and philosophy. Industrialism, the reaction against the French Revolution, socialism, capitalism, democracy, Darwin's theory of evolution, the widening influence of science, and the social crises of the twentieth century are the themes dealt with in fourteen chapters of selected passages. It is interesting to find included a three page selection from Bishop Von Ketteler and nineteen pages from Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*. The last chapter has selections from the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Weimar Constitution, the Soviet Constitution of 1936, the Indictment of Nazi Individuals and Organizations by the International Military Tribunal, and the United Nations Charter.

Each of the selected readings is prefaced by a few pages of explanatory introduction. Though both volumes are provided with a table of contents, neither of them has an index. Here and there, as for example in the introductions to the passages from Darwin, Tylor, and Freud, the writers seem to ignore the existence of philosophies and beliefs about man other than materialistic or naturalistic ones. One wonders why no selections from racialists like Houston Stewart Chamberlain or Gobineau were included. Among

unfamiliar writers from whom passages are included there are: Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876-1925), whose *Das dritte Reich* furnished the Nazis with much of their phraseology and ideology; Maurice Barrès (1862-1923), the French novelist who inspired French royalist nationalism; and Andrew Ure (1778-1857), the Scottish chemist, whose *Philosophy of Manufactures* (1835), waxed enthusiastic over child labor and the healthy working conditions to be found in factories. A teacher's manual (pp. 163 mimeo-printed: \$1) provides valuable supplementary remarks.

ERNEST F. KILZER, O.S.B.

St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn.

Health Insurance in the United States. By N. Sinai, O. W. Anderson and M. L. Dollar. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1946. Pp. xvi+115. \$1.50.

Too many of our people are ill with too little provision for care. To the nation this represents annually a great loss that could be prevented by a wider distribution of medical assistance and by better insurance for medical and hospital treatment.

In the book, *Health Insurance in the United States*, there is a succinct account of the history of voluntary group health prepayment and a brief survey of features that presently signify hope for the future. This work is the result of a constructive policy of the Committee on Medicine and the Changing Order of the New York Academy of Medicine, organized in 1942 to review current economic and social changes; their relationship to medicine and the future service of the public. Topics of importance to all members of our Society in view of proposed legislation are: the health insurance movement since 1910, attitudes of professional, government and lay groups, enabling legislation for voluntary plans, characteristic features of voluntary plans and problems, and the continuance of the health insurance movement. These aspects of the subject receive careful and exact treatment from Dr. Nathan Sinai and his associates of the School of Public Health at the University of Michigan. They offer in this monograph a realistic and factual presentation of the important issues in the history of health insurance with their evaluation of contemporary trends.

Recognition of the relationship between the medical sciences and arts and social conditions marks the work as an interesting one for sociologists to consider because the reflection of social and economic change in the altered attitudes of influential groups seems to promise a future resolution of the difficulties that now limit or prohibit adequate medical and hospital care for many of our citizens.

MARGARET MARY TOOLE

College of Notre Dame of Maryland, Baltimore 10, Md.

Psychiatric Interviews with Children. Edited by H. L. Witmer. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1946. Pp. v+443. \$4.50.

Tutoring as Therapy. By Grace Arthur. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1946. Pp. vii+125. \$1.50.

Both of these books should prove useful to all professional people who are in any way concerned with children whose adjustments in the home or at school do not approximate the desired normal.

Psychiatric Interviews with Children presents ten moving and illustrative case histories of children referred to child guidance clinics for psychiatric assistance. The editor has compiled an interesting and readable assortment of descriptive material.

The complete work subscribes to the theory that utilization of the therapist-patient relationships in the clinical situation constitutes the best that modern and dynamic psychiatric methods have to offer in the field of child guidance. The ways in which these "therapeutic-relationships" were established and maintained by eight therapists and their child clients, and the beneficial results sustained after termination of the interviews, are described in the case histories.

The orientation of the book as a whole is not that of any one particular school (Freudian, Adlerian, Meyerian, Rankian, etc.). The approaches of the eight therapists whose training and experiential background differs in some respect have one startlingly common yet distinctive characteristic: establishment and conscious use of the therapist-patient relationship for therapeutic ends. Flexibility is thus assured, and the immediate techniques employed can be "custom made" for each child's individual needs.

Each of the cases described is at once simple and dramatic in solution. While the simplicity might be attributed to the seemingly effortless skill of the therapist, the movement and content traced through successive interviews are arresting. Although the "mechanics of reading" are seriously interfered with by the numerous footnotes appearing with consistent frequency on each page, the explanation and analysis of such significant details as have in this way been "flagged" for the reader are of real value. Editorial explanation of choice of cases, form of organization of the material, and prefatory remarks and concluding comments of the therapists are comprehensive and should prove helpful to the reader whatever his professional background.

Dr. Arthur's book considers the field of tutoring as the therapeutic agent in behavior cases precipitated by school maladjustment and failure to learn. In an easily read and sympathetic way the author discusses almost informally the needs of children whose mental ages were such that adequate progress in school could reasonably have been expected. Each of the numerous illustrative case histories presents the results of the psychological examinations, recommendations for remedial measures, and the measure of success achieved accordingly.

As in the book discussed above, the child is seen to be the dynamic factor in the situation. Within him, in proportion to the mental and emotional maturation he has attained and with relation to the security afforded by the social situation in which he finds himself, reside those forces necessary to affect the rehabilitation desired.

The tutor in the role of therapist helps the child to achieve and maintain success in school subjects at the age and grade levels of which he is intellectually capable. By improving thus his academic status and relieving such tensions as accrued at school and in the home because of recognized failures, the child is enabled to enter into more positive relationships with the family and school.

Dr. Arthur writes with a depth of insight and feeling of situations frequently encountered in her own vast experiences. Such therapy as she subscribes to in her valuable book is admittedly restricted initially to cases where no extreme disturbances or organic factors present themselves.

MARY MCNEILL

Chicago 29, Illinois

SHORT NOTICES

The Sociology of Rural Life. Revised edition. By T. Lynn Smith. New York: Harper & Bros., 1947. Pp. xvi-634. \$4.

Since the first edition of Professor Lynn Smith's book, with its brief discussion of method, and its chapters on social processes and demography, had a definite place as a college text, the author has wisely adhered to his original plan in this newly revised edition. Doubtless to save expense, many of the former charts, tables, maps have been retained from the earlier edition, instead of being brought up-to-date, but in other respects the typography, headings, etc., are now clearer than before, and the book is in every way better. It seems a pity that the author has so clearly labelled his text for sophomores, as the subject is more often taught to juniors and seniors, and with the usual student references to other texts and more advanced readings, it would admirably suit them.

Survey of Social Science. Revised edition. By Marion B. Smith. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1945. Pp. xx+728. \$4.

This attractively produced introductory text will please many teachers of the difficult freshman survey course. Unfortunately, it is hardly suited as a text in a Catholic college because there are many statements in the chapters on religion and marriage and elsewhere, which are unscientific and show an anti-religious, anti-Christian bias. Yet it would be useful collateral reading if students are prepared to examine statements scientifically, in order to discover the errors and bias so regrettably common in the social science field, and to know the content of a text such as this, which undoubtedly will enjoy a wide sale in secular institutions. More care in selecting bibliographies, and attention to the avoidance of bias, would greatly improve any further revising of this text.

Your Community. Third edition. By J. C. Colcord. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947. Pp. 263. \$1.50.

It is impossible to imagine teaching a course in social problems, community organization, urban sociology, introductory social work, or American minority groups, without making reference to this book. Nurses and social workers will find it especially valuable because it points to normal community provisions for needed services of all types. High school sociology teachers will also find it very useful. This present edition has been thoroughly revised and brought up to date; only the St. Louis graphs on pages 22, 23 remain as before. As in previous editions, the book does not give facts about community resources, but by asking hundreds of questions, with some integrating comment, it shows what facilities are available in a well-organized city or small town, and points to what is lacking.

Social Work Year Book 1947. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947. Pp. 714. \$3.50.

This biennial "Yearbook" is always welcome, containing as it does so much up-to-date information in handy form. As usual, each article has been rewritten, and a number of new topics have been added. The Catholic will be glad that at least three or four Catholics have contributed to this work: Miss Jane Hoey of the Advisory Committee, Miss Anna King, Miss Rose McHugh, and possibly some others: not, however, so many as ought to be there, considering our numbers. The article on Catholic Social Work is this year written by Rev. James T. McDonnell. He gives much valuable information, but his story is not so complete as that of "Jewish Social Work." Whether this is due to space limitations, or some other cause, one would wish to see a more complete factual picture when the 1949 Yearbook is issued. Obviously this book is essential for all libraries, and should be privately owned by all professional sociologists, social workers, and those who want the actual facts about our social organization and facilities, and proposed social legislation, presented in a handy, readable, and competent way.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

The Social Thought of John Lancaster Spalding. By Sister Agnes Claire Schroll, O.S.B., Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1944. Pp. xxii+297. \$3.

Bishop Spalding of Peoria (1840-1916) was so notable a figure that an analysis of his expressed thoughts on society and the social problems of his day has a definite place in our literature. All interested in a history of the Church, in the development of Catholic social thinking in the United States, and in the social conditions of Bishop Spalding's times, will find this work of value.

The Socio-Economic Aspects of Horse Racing. By J. R. O'Hare. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1945. Pp. xiii+131. \$1.50.

Father O'Hare here provides a short history of horse racing, book making, and pari-mutuels, with some discussion of the social effects

of horse race wagering, attempted legislation against such wagering, horse racing as a social institution, and attitudes of groups interested in horse racing. The author probably rightly concludes that horse racing, given proper controls, can be a good thing; but then he comes from Kentucky.

Some Religious and Ethical Problems in the Practice of Catholic Social Workers. By Dorothy M. Abts. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1945. Pp. x+125. \$1.50.

The author of this dissertation induced 35 social workers to tell her about some of the religious and ethical problems which they encountered in their practice. It is difficult to see how the subject matter fits in with a doctoral degree in sociology, but it will undoubtedly be of value to Catholic social workers, who are trying to solve the conflict which sometimes exists between current social work technique and Christian doctrine and morality.

The Position of Women in Early China. By Albert R. O'Hara, S.J. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1945. Pp. xii-301. \$3.25.

The position of women in any society is indicative of economic and family organization, and to some extent also of educational and moral levels, and other social data of interest to sociologists. Father O'Hara's study is particularly valuable because he was able to go to original Chinese sources for his materials. He has not made any attempt at comparative study, but he has provided well-done resumé's, and often full accounts, of the biographies of many important women of ancient times.

A Sociological Commentary on "Divini Redemptoris." By John P. Lerhinan, C.Ss.R. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1946. Pp. xiii+216. \$2.50.

All who are of the opinion that they should make a study of the important social encyclicals of recent popes will want to purchase and read this commentary. It is given as a "sociological commentary," because first the encyclical is divided into sections, each section is given at length, and a précis then follows, with a commentary about the reasons, or conditions, or past history, or writings of Marx and others, which led Pope Pius XI to write his well-known work. The well-informed professional Catholic sociologist or social philosopher will find little new in the work, but for those who are not professed students of the social encyclicals, Father Lerhinan's dissertation is of the utmost importance; and even those who are experts will find it interesting reading.

Corrigenda

A line was omitted from the following review in the last issue of the ACSR. The review is now given in full below:

Morals in Politics and Professions. By Francis J. Connell, C.S.S.R., Westminster, Md.: The Newman Bookshop, 1946. Pp. vii+187. \$2.50.

Father Connell has here provided a plain-speaking and very practical guide for the moral conduct of politicians, legislators, judges, members of the armed forces and the police forces; lawyers, doctors, nurses, public school teachers, social workers, and all others connected with public office. It seems a pity that a chapter or two did not extend the work to cover the private citizen in his social dealings with others, e.g., that the author's discussion of the obligation of those in public office to pay taxes was not extended to what justice requires of the ordinary citizen. All who are aware of how many Catholics neglect their obligations of justice in social relations, and the serious harm which their bad example does to the extension of the Church, will welcome this excellent book, which has long been needed and is now presented with such admirable restraint, insight, and clarity.

PERIODICAL REVIEWS

C. J. NUESSE, *Editor*

The Catholic University of America
Washington 17, D. C.

Recent articles with special pertinence for Catholic sociologists

Connell, Francis J., C.Ss.R., "When is a Strike Lawful?," *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, 116 (2): 81-92. February 1947.

Catholic theologians, none of whom would now question the lawfulness of the strike as a weapon when properly used, view it as a kind of war which in order to be just *objectively* must be waged (1) for a just reason, (2) in anticipation of benefits which will outweigh the evils likely to occur, and (3) by means which are morally good. *Subjectively*, the strikers must have a right intention. In order to apply these conditions various kinds of strikes must be differentiated, principally the defensive, undertaken against the actual injustice of an employer; the ameliorative, directed toward obtaining better conditions, though those prevailing are not strictly unjust; and the sympathetic, declared in support of another striking union. Further distinctions qualify these. One of the most important involves the nature of the work in which the employees are engaged, whether in ordinary private industry, in essential industry, in ordinary governmental employment, or in governmental duties directly involving the public welfare and especially its safety. The rights of employers and the public must at all times be respected. There are comments on "conscientious objec-

tors" in strikes, on the proper calling of strikes, and on the necessity for Catholic workers to take part in union affairs. Priests are exhorted to sympathize with labor, but to be objective in judging particular strikes, and, above all, to preach social justice and the reform of the industrial system according to Catholic social teaching.

Einaudi, Mario, "Christian Democracy in Italy," *The Review of Politics*, 9 (1): 16-33. January 1947.

Sturzo, Luigi, "The Philosophic Background of Christian Democracy," *ibid.*, 3-15.

Modern Catholics have too often indulged in negative polemics against the enemies of the Church rather than in positive action, forgetting, as Don Sturzo notes, that "Christian theories will bear no weight, even as theories (apart from school exercises) if there are no politico-social currents which give them actualization and experimentation" (p. 15). Christian Democracy in Europe has emerged as a movement on a political plane, informed by Catholic teaching, but not to be confused with the hierarchical direction of the Church, with Catholic activities on behalf of labor, or with various other (generally conservative) Catholics in public life

concerned with religious interests. Morality in public life is the continuing problem, ever unsolved in its practical applications, even to some extent in its theories. Because so many Catholics so long confused philosophical theories with political institutions, modern democratic regimes have grown outside the Church. (Sturzo apparently derives American democracy, as well as European, from Rousseau, but notes the idea prevailing "in Church circles" that its roots were in the Christian spirit of the Founding Fathers, pp. 11-12.) Only after Leo's encyclicals did Christian Democracy spring forth, uniting in a program the two currents of progressive nineteenth-century Catholic thought: (1) alignment with constitutional systems based on political liberty, and (2) efforts for the moral, economic, and political rehabilitation of the working classes. Revisions in political thought are most evident today in personalism, pluralism, and institutionalism. Frank judgments on historical events and personalities lend additional interest to this analysis.

Einaudi describes the current plight of the Italian party which counts Sturzo among its forbears, especially its constitutional problems. The mixed composition of the party and its complex ideological character suggest that a trend away from the simple and clear-cut divisions of European political life may be beginning. If American experience is at all relevant, the composite nature of the movement will be in the long run a source of strength.

Fenton, Joseph Clifford, "Anti-clericalism and Catholic Unity," *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, 61 (1): 51-67. January 1947.

Anti-clericalism is defined as "nothing more or less than antipathy or opposition on the part of Catholics to the hierarchy or the priesthood in general and to their own spiritual leaders in particular, for

whatever reason such an attitude is adopted" (p. 53). The attitude betrays ignorance or failure to appreciate the fact that the powers of the hierarchy are not confined to the dispensing of the sacraments or the teaching of doctrine, but include a real power to rule with the authority of Christ Himself. The Church is a real and organized society; its corporate activity is the social expression of the life of grace; and Catholics must give whole-hearted cooperation to its work, as it is actually directed, even if they consider that direction to be unwise or ineffective in its policies or administration. In political or civil matters, the hierarchy and clergy must be heard and respected but not necessarily followed. The motives of anti-clericalism are held to be adverse judgment on the conduct or policies of ecclesiastics, or a manifest desire to be accepted by "the anti-Catholic world" (p. 56). No attempt is made to place the phenomenon in a broader social context; only the application of doctrine is considered.

Griffin, J. J., "The Apostolate of the Aged," *The Catholic Charities Review*, 30 (10): 255-58. December 1946.

, "Browsing Through the Ages: The Bible and Old Age," *Journal of Gerontology*, 1 (4): 464-71. October 1946.

, "Sacred Liturgy and Social Work," *The Magnificat*, 77 (4-6): 185-90, 224-31, 297-304. February, March, April 1946.

There is no doubt that the increasing number of old people in our population, plus the economic and industrial changes which make them relatively unemployable, the growing sense of social responsibility for the plight of the aged, all combine to present a problem that Catholics have not adequately met, in spite of the heroic work of the Little Sisters of the Poor and the various services of hospitals. In the first of these

articles, the author, who is a Supervisor in the Bureau of Old Age Assistance, indicates areas of services and recounts the personal gratification expressed to him many times by the donors of these services.

Turning a spotlight on the Biblical treatment of the aged produces some interesting results. Lacking modern measuring devices, one of the sacred writers points out the differences between chronological and psychological age and even hits at the social quotient. References are accumulated to show the observations on the more obvious disadvantages of age and, in a brighter vein, the happier aspects *de senectute*. In Chesterton's words,

We who have found it good to be young,

Will find it good to be old.

"Catholic Social Work liturgically motivated" is recommended to allay the fears, despair and confusion by which we are surrounded. With emphasis on the spiritual poverty of our age so complacently disregarded by many of the social work profession, the author presents a case for the extension both of the term "liturgy" and the areas to which social workers administer. Well does he comment on the misappropriation of the term "social diseases" by one of their miserable effects when the term should be applied precisely to the causes of these diseases plus countless other resultants. Considered within the broad definition though literal meaning of the term, he insists that "Every Catholic should be a Social Worker liturgically inspired" (p. 303). This indeed places a heavy obligation on the shoulders of those whose training and experience give them a greater awareness of social needs. (SISTER MARY LIGOURI, B.V.M., *Mundelein College, Chicago 40, Ill.*)

La Farge, John, S.J., "Caste in the Church: II. The Roman Catholic Experience," *Survey Graphic*, 36 (1): 61-62, 104-6. January 1947.

This article is part of a "Calling America" number devoted to the problem of segregation which deserves to be read widely and in which teachers of social studies may find helpful material. After stating simply the universal character which marks the Church, Father La Farge distinguishes four patterns of Negro segregation found among American Catholics: the traditional, a "compensatory" type accepted as an alternative to neglect, theoretical or planned segregation representing an indefensible ecclesiastical policy, and voluntary segregation. Four integrative patterns represent degrees in the attainment of the Catholic parochial ideal: the minimum policy retaining biracialism, the incomplete break found with the abolition of official biracialism while racial parishes are still maintained in the diocese, complete official integration, and complete actual integration. Some signs of hope are noted and a final prediction made: "Full and complete integration of the Negro in the Catholic Church in the United States is a future certainty" (p. 106).

McKinnon, Harold R., "The Higher Law: Reaction Has Permeated Our Legal Thinking," *American Bar Association Journal*, 33 (2): 106-9, 202-4. February 1947.

The thesis of this address to a Judicial Conference in California is a surprising departure from the view that permeates the social thought of today, phrased by one pioneer sociologist as "The mores can make anything right." When expressed in the area of politics and law the dictum becomes, "Law is what Congress says it is — and what the courts say Congress meant."

The author, of the San Francisco Bar, faces the problem squarely — what is the logical terminus of a society which accepts such a dogma in its stark reality? Quoting prominent national figures who have pro-

fessed to discredit such a fundamental American (and Catholic!) doctrine that man is endowed by nature with inalienable rights, he draws pertinent quotations from the writings of many American opinion-makers, then demonstrates the identity of their tenets with the dogmas of the Nazis, Fascists, Communists, and academic totalitarians, the last type of which he contends "permeates our legal theory." He points out the misapprehension of those who say that the concept of natural law is unacceptable in a dynamic, progressive society. Obviously the familiar distinction between a principle of natural law and its current application to instant problems,

which latter is elastic and adjustable, is completely overlooked by these champions of progress. The "structure of the household of the law" is a three-story edifice of principles precepts, and rules, and if rules are based on invalid principles and precepts, they are doomed to become instruments of tyranny rather than of justice.

In addition to the scholarly merits of the article, it is heartening to find in a periodical of this kind such a frank statement of principles which at the present time are both utterly reasonable and unpopular.

(SISTER MARY LIGOURI, B.V.M.,
Mundelein College, Chicago 40, Ill.)

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